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To ensure the quality and correctness of this deliverable, we implied an internal review and 
validation process. The deliverable was drafted by the work package leader (BOKU) and co-
leader (UNIBO). All CONSOLE partners reviewed the draft D2.4 document. Finally, the draft 
version was submitted to the project coordinator, for final review and validation. 
1 Summary 
This document represents deliverable D2.4 “Report on WP2 lessons learned” within work 
package WP2 “Diagnostic of existing experiences on AECPGs” of the EU Horizon 2020 project 
CONSOLE. The document brings together results and conclusions of WP2 Task 2.5. Particularly, 
the results from the analysis of solutions from inside the EU will be complemented with 
experiences beyond the CONSOLE EU case studies in order to derive inspiration and additional 
ideas for improvements of European solutions in WP3 and WP4. Moreover, the lessons learned 







The main objective of this document is to provide lessons learned from a variety of existing 
(implemented) contract solutions for the improved delivery of AECPGs in and outside the EU. 
To achieve this objective, the deliverable takes the following structural approach: first, an 
introduction of the CONSOLE EU case studies is given by analysing them as regards contract 
characteristics, Agri-Environmental-Climate Public Goods addressed (AECPGs), forestry and 
farming systems, contract partnerships, financing parties, and payment mechanisms. The results 
of this analysis are presented as graphs and figures and serve as a general overview, but also as a 
guideline to identify trends and beneficial combinations. Second, based on a qualitative analysis, 
contract specifications and reasons for success and failure of the CONSOLE EU case studies are 
presented. Here, reasons for success and failure are elicited for the single contract types 
individually (RB/RO, CO/COOP, VC, and LT). Third, reasons for the success of exemplary cases 
outside the EU and cases beyond the CONSOLE EU case studies are described (see Deliverable 
2.2). Fourth, general conclusions and recommendations are drawn, considering EU case studies, 
case studies outside the EU and in-depth case studies (see Deliverable 2.3).  
Through this approach, D2.4 provides insights about the specificities and framework conditions 
driving the success of the contract solutions presented in the case studies. Also, the deliverable 
can provide a knowledge basis about what needs to be considered when improving contract 
solutions for the enhanced provision of AECPGs. 
2.2 Tasks addressed 
Deliverable 2.4 concludes on the activities carried out in task 2.2 and 2.3 of the project. Moreover, 
Deliverable 2.4 is the direct result of task 2.5. 
Task 2.2 Data collection, selection and diagnosis of reasons for successes and failures of 
initiatives in Europe (M4-M11) 
Leader: BOKU; Co-Leader: UNIBO; Contributors: ALL 
Task T2.2 collected and analysed 58 exemplary contract solution case studies in Europe. 
Moreover, in task 2.2 data was collected for 2 case studies in non-European countries. All of these 
cases have been described using the format of uniform and structured factsheets (D2.1) and have 
undergone a diagnosis of reasons for success and failures. Moreover, 26 case studies did undergo 
a qualitative in-depth analysis of which specific framework conditions and contract specifications 
led to a better fulfilment of environmental objectives and a better efficiency as regards different 
types of performance such as longevity, acceptance, effectiveness, etc. (D2.3). 
Task 2.3 Data collection, selection and diagnosis of reasons for successes and failures of 
initiatives in Europe (M4-M11) 
Leader: UNIBO; Contributors: BOKU, LUKE, TRAME 
Task T2.3 collected promising and successful experiences outside the EU and cases beyond the 
CONSOLE EU case studies. To optimise the usefulness of task 2.3 for the project, the activities 
of the task have been revised during the first reporting period: After initial attempts to replicate 
the activities carried out in 2.2 also for selected cases outside the EU, it was decided to rather 




targeted by the CONSOLE consortium and if such case studies can provide a more complete view 
of the issue.  
Task 2.5 Lessons learned (M9-M11) 
Leader: BOKU; Co-Leader: UNIBO 
Task 2.5 brings together results and conclusions of WP2. Particularly the results from the analysis 
of experiences inside the EU are compared with solutions from outside the EU and cases beyond 
the CONSOLE EU case studies in order to derive inspiration and additional ideas for the 
improvement of European contract solutions carried out in WP3 and WP4. Moreover, the lessons 
learned give a first overview for policy makers on innovative and successful solutions “outside 
the box”. 
2.3 Outline 
Deliverable D2.4 is structured as follows: Chapter 3 gives an overview of the CONSOLE EU case 
studies in the 13 partner countries analysed by different characteristics and insights into contract 
specifications and reasons for success and failure of the four different contract types addressed 
by CONSOLE. Chapter 4 presents the lessons learned from cases beyond the CONSOLE EU case 
studies. Chapter 5 combines the findings of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 and provides general 
recommendations.  Chapter 6 gives an outlook on further use of Deliverable 2.4 for scientific 
analyses and for practice. 
3 Lessons learned from contract solutions from inside EU 
3.1 Overview on EU case studies 
In this chapter, the CONSOLE EU case studies are presented based on different characteristics.  
In detail, the case studies are presented and analysed by  
• country, 
• contract characteristics,  
• AECPGs addressed,  
• forestry and farming system,  
• contract partnership,  
• financing party and 
• payment mechanism.  
 
The contract characteristics were evaluated individually and in combination. The presented 
figures serve as a general overview, but also as a guideline to identify trends and beneficial 
combinations. 
Data for 58 first-level case studies were collected in 13 European countries. For each country, a 
number of four first-level case studies were envisaged. This number was reached in all countries, 
and some countries delivered even up to six cases. Moreover, data was collected for 2 case studies 
in non-European countries. These 2 cases are included in the assessment of European cases as 
well, as a Finish pilot case builds upon the presented non-EU experience (FI1), while the 




The first-level analysis has been complemented by a second-level analysis, performing an in-
depth assessment of 26 of the 60 EU case studies. A detailed elaboration of the findings of the in-
depth analysis can be found in Deliverable D2.3. 
 




Figure 2: CONSOLE in-depth cases 
In principle, CONSOLE case studies are examples of existing1, innovative2 and effective3 contract 
solutions aimed at improving the provision of AECPGs. However, for the purposes of covering 
failures, CONSOLE case studies can also represent real life proposals of contract solutions that 
for some reasons have never arrived at the stage of generating impact, but that can provide 
relevant insights (e.g. measures that opened calls without participation, contract proposals with 
no uptake, measures proved impossible due to regulatory constraints at EU level, etc.). Moreover, 
a CONSOLE case study is a case of real implementation of a specific contract “type”. In 
accordance with the CONSOLE Deliverable D1.1, contract solutions suited to be a case study in 
CONSOLE represent the contract types described in Box 1: 
                                                     
1 existing: implemented 
2 innovative: new, promising, highly potential approaches, as well as ‘old’ approaches implemented in a new context, region, new 
place, etc. 
3 effective: reaching the objectives 
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Box 1: Contract solutions covered in CONSOLE 
Figure 3 gives an overview on the distribution of contract types throughout all CONSOLE EU 
case studies. The classification of contract types is based on the partners’ own assignment. 
Contracts that are purely action-based are excluded from the CONSOLE scope.  
In parts, the contract solutions represented by the EU case studies are assigned to a single contract 
type. Some of the case studies however represent combinations or hybrids of different contract 
types (e.g. a result-based approach with collective implementation). For the general overview in 
figure 3, each case study has been screened for its “strongest” contract type element, and has then 
been assigned to the respective contract type group. Contract solutions which cannot be assigned 
to one main contract type, because two or more contract types are equally involved in the solution, 
are represented in each contract type group they have been assigned to.  
Overview of main contract types
 
Figure 3: Number of case studies listed by contract type 
Figure 3 reveals that 22 contract solutions are assigned to the main contract type of collective 
implementation/cooperation (CO/COOP), including 18 cases representing collective 
implementation and 4 representing cooperations4. Five collective case studies are double-counted 
because a second main contract type is involved. CO/COOP contract solutions are thus the most 
numerous in the project closely followed by result-based/result-oriented (RB/RO) solutions (21 
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CONSOLE focuses on 4 types of contract solutions: 
 
Result-based/result-oriented contracts (RB/RO): Contracts specifying an 
environmental/climate result as reference parameter (in RB solutions, results are the 
reference parameter even for payments) 
 
Collective implementation/cooperation (CO/COOP): Contracts implementing a 
formalised cooperation among farmers/actors in view of delivering AECPGs (in CO 
solutions, even payments are issued collectively and then distributed between the 
members of the collective) 
 
Value chain-based contracts (VC): Contracts connecting the delivery of AECPGs 
with the production of private goods  
 
Land tenure-based contracts (LT): Land tenure arrangements with environmental 
clauses 




cases). The distribution of RB and RO contract solutions in the RB/RO pillar is nearly half/half; 
11 of the contract solutions are explicitly result-based, 10 contract solutions are result-oriented 
contracts5. Again, 7 RB/RO contract solutions are characterised by incorporating a second main 
contract type. 15 case studies are assigned to the contract type group of value chain (VC) based 
solutions, 10 case studies belong to the group of land tenure (LT) based contracts (4 case studies 
each include a second main contract type). Finally, there are 3 case studies which are not directly 
assignable to one of the four contract types, therefore, they are assigned to an additional category 
named ‘others’.  
Contract solutions with only one contract type involved
 
Figure 4: Number of contracts where only one feature is involved 
The bar charts in figure 4 depict contract solution cases with only one contract type involved. 
Compared to the total number, the figure reveals that particularly VC based solutions only rarely 
involve other contract type elements, 11 of the 15 VC cases are characterised by showing no 
characteristics of other types. Also, LT contracts mostly don’t show elements of other contract 
types, here 6 of the 10 LT contracts include only land tenure elements. Collective contracts in 
contrast tend to appear more frequently in contract combinations, only 13 of the 22 CO/COOP 
contracts are characterised by solely CO/COOP elements. In RB/RO schemes, hybrids are most 
common, consequently only few contract solutions (7 of 21) include only RB/RO elements.  
Contract solutions with more than one contract type involved 
 
Figure 5: Number of contract type combinations in the case studies6 
Figure 5 gives an overview of the occurrence of contract type combinations. The combination of 
RO/RB with CO/COOP contract types, with a number of 8 cases, is by far the most frequent 
combination. The mix of RO/RB and value chain (VC) contract types appears 3 times. 2 
                                                     
5 A detailed definition and differentiation between result-based and result-oriented can be found in chapter 3.3.1. 
6 This graphic shows the appearance of combinations with two main types as well as contract solutions that have one main contract 
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contractual solutions include both land tenure (LT) and CO/COOP components. VC and 
CO/COOP appears 1 time, it must be said, that in some of the other VC contracts a cooperative 
element in form of an association or foundation is also included, which are not considered in 
figure 5.  Moreover, 6 case studies represent combinations of three different contract types, all of 
them combinations with land tenure.  
An overview of all contract types and combinations can be found in the appendix (table 12).  
CONSOLE considers 14 different AECPGs (see Box 2). In the case studies, a distinction is made 
as to whether the AECPGs are addressed directly or indirectly by the contract solution. By 
definition, only when the contract solution is directly aimed at maintaining or improving specific 
AECPGs, they are designated as ‘directly’ addressed (figure 6). If the improvement of the AECPG 
is a by-product of the measures taken, they are considered ‘indirectly’ addressed (figure 7). 
 
Box 2: CONSOLE list of agri-environmental-climate public goods (AECPGs) 
Figure 6 and 7 show that all CONSOLE AECPGs were addressed directly and/or indirectly in at 
least one of the 60 case studies. At this, the public good "(Farmland) biodiversity/habitats" is the 
most frequently addressed with a count of 46 case studies directly addressing 
biodiversity/habitats, and a count of 47 in total (directly and indirectly addressed). The figures 
reveal that in more than ¾ of the case studies, biodiversity is paramount. The AECPGs following 
biodiversity/habitats in frequency is "Landscape and scenery". It is directly addressed 17 times 
by the case studies and 35 times in total. Here, a synergy effect between the improvements of 
biodiversity/habitats and the amelioration of landscape and scenery can be assumed, as measures 
targeting an improvement in biodiversity/habitats can simultaneously have a positive influence 
on landscape appearance (e.g. flower strips, landscape elements, etc.). Third in frequency is the 
AECPG "Water quality" with 14 direct mentions and 22 indirect mentions, the latter count 
meaning that ¼ of the CONSOLE EU case studies approach water quality either directly or 









indirectly. Looking at the sum of direct and indirect mentions, also the AECPGs of "Rural 
viability and vitality" and “Cultural heritage” are addressed often (24 counts, and 17 counts 
respectively). However, "Rural viability and vitality" as well as "Cultural heritage" are rarely the 
key AECPGs addressed in the contracts. They are mainly addressed indirectly as a side product 
of the improvement of other “main” AECPGs. Like water quality, also the AECPG of "Soil 
quality (and health)" is addressed by ¼ of the case studies directly and/or indirectly. Also, the 2 
AECPGs addressing climate regulation, namely "climate regulation - greenhouse gas emissions” 
and “climate regulation - carbon storage", together account for a total of 22 mentions (direct and 
indirect) and therefore are also addressed by ¼ of the case studies.  
In cases where the AECPG "Farm animal health and welfare" is present, it is usually the pivotal 
PG in the contract (7 direct and 1 indirect). Similarly, also the AECPG of "Resilience to natural 
hazards", is often pivotal if addressed (11 times directly addressed, 3 times indirectly). 
“Recreational access/Improvements to physical and mental health” is mentioned 6 times directly 
and 4 times indirectly. The AECPGs "Water quantity", "Quality and security of products" and 
“Air quality” play a subordinate role in the CONSOLE EU case studies.  
 
Figure 6: Overview of AECPGs directly addressed in the case studies 
 
Figure 7: Overview of AECPGs, directly and indirectly, addressed in the case studies 
  


















AECPGs directly addressed in the case studies






















AECPGs addressed by different contract type 
Figures 8-12 on the left 
illustrate the frequency 
of AECPGs being 
directly addressed by 
different contract types. 
The AECPGs displayed 
refer to those explicitly 
stated by the partners in 
the fact sheets. Some 
case studies are 
excluded because of 
double-counting, this is 
indicated underneath 
the individual figures. 
Figures 8-12 provide 
information on the 
average number of 
AECPGs addressed by 
the contract types, and 
on the AECPGs ranked 
by quantity. The 
comparison reveals that 
particularly contract 
solutions based on 
collective implement-
ation/cooperation, 
target a broader number 
of AECPGs, while 
result-based and result-
oriented solutions are 
obviously targeted to 
the improvement of 
only a smaller number 
of AECPGs. As regards 
the distribution of 
AECPGs, no clear 
tendency becomes obvious. In all contract types biodiversity is the most addressed AECPG. It 
can be noted that – compared to the other groups of contract types – result based solutions have a 
stronger focus on the provision of concrete and measurable, environmental AECPGs, such as 
biodiversity, water quality, soil quality and carbon sequestration. In contrast, more 
comprehensive, social AECPGs, such as rural viability or cultural heritage are more prominent in 
contractual solutions based on collective implementation and cooperation. The AECPG of quality 
and security of products is addressed particularly in the value chain based contract solutions while 
nearly neglected in all other contract types groups.  
CONSOLE aims at the development of improved contract solutions for the provision of AECPGs 
from both agriculture and forestry. Therefore, the CONSOLE case studies reflect contract 
solutions designed for agriculture, as well as contract solutions explicitly addressing forestry. 
 
Figure 8: AECPGs addressed in result-based contract solutions 
 
Figure 9: AECPGs addressed in result-oriented contract solutions 
 
Figure 10: AECPGs addressed in collective/cooperation contract solutions 
 
Figure 11: AECPGs addressed in value-chain based contract solutions 
 





Figure 13 shows that 47 of the 60 case study contract solutions are particularly designed for 
agriculture, while 9 contract solutions specifically address forestry. 2 case studies are suitable for 
both systems. The case studies LV3 and IT2 are assigned to being undefined: In LV3, all types of 
land-owners can participate regardless of whether a specific land management system is involved 
and IT2 failed before the introduction of the case study and for this reason, is not assigned to any 




In Table 1 and Table 2, the contract solutions are further subdivided. The tables intend to provide 








































ES4;  ES3 
FR4; IRL3; 
NL3; IRL4;  
BG3; AT1 
Table 1: Agricultural or forestry systems covered by the individual contract solutions 1 
Table 1 reveals that 13 case studies are focused on grassland farming and 11 case studies on arable 
farming. 8 case studies can be adapted to a mix of different farming types. The farming type 
“Permanent” occurs in 6 case studies including farms producing wine, olives, and fruits. Some 
contract solutions are specifically targeted to a specific farm type: 4 contract solutions directly 

































9 5 11 1 
Case studies IT5; FR2; UK2; 
UK3; UK4; UK5; 











Table 2: Agricultural or forestry systems covered by the individual contract solutions 2 
Some of the contract solutions covered by the CONSOLE case studies are oriented towards 
farming systems prevalent in specific landscapes/habitats: 9 contract solutions are designed for 
farms that are located within river catchment, water basin, or flood plain areas. Another 5 
contractual solutions are targeted to farms managing semi-natural habitats. 11 contract solutions 
are aimed at forests and 1 contract solution specifically targets the improvement of AECPGs in 
peatlands.  
Figure 14 gives an overview on the distribution of 
contract solutions targeted to a specific area and 
contract solutions not specifically addressing 
certain regions or areas. The figure reveals that 
nearly ¾ of the contract solutions represented by 
the CONSOLE EU case studies are targeted to a 
specific area or region. In 17 case studies, no 
evidence of targeting a specific region could be 
noticed, therefore it was assumed that 
participation is open to farmers or foresters across 
the whole country. 
 
In the figures 15 – 21, the contractual partnerships of the contract solutions are delineated, the 
financing parties are pointed out, the EU support mechanism, if available, is indicated and the 
payment mechanisms are analysed.  
Contract relationships  
Regarding the contractual relationships in the case studies, five different relationships can be 
distinguished, namely private-private, private-public, civil society-private, public-public, and 
public-private-civil society. 
Figure 14: Targetedness of contract solutions 
to specific areas  
72%
28%
Targetedness of contract 






Figure 15 shows that nearly half of the 
contracts are public-private 
relationships. Private-private relation-
ships rank second with 36%. Only 
12% of the contract solutions represent 
three-way public-private-civil society 
relationships. 4% of the contract 
solutions represents civil society 
(NGO)–private relationships and 2% 
(one case study) has a contractual 
relationship involving two public 
parties.7 When taking a closer look 
into the contract types, it is revealed 
that nearly all value chain contracts are 
private-private, and the majority of the 
collective contracts are public-private 
contract relationship.  
 
Financing party 
The CONSOLE contract solutions 
represented by the case studies are 
characterised by different types of 
financing parties (Figure 16): In 60% 
of the cases, contract solutions are 
funded or co-funded by 
public/governmental bodies. Hereby, 
contract solutions based on 
governmental schemes include all 
instruments that are financed by the 
government, i.e. with public money 
(for example AES, land incentives, 
and tax incentives). In the figure, 
governmental schemes are further 
divided into schemes with and without 
EU-funding. In schemes with EU-
funding, EU-funding is involved to a 
certain amount, meaning that all or part of the funding originates from the EU. 41% of the 
CONSOLE case studies are EU co-funded schemes, where the financing party is the national or 
regional government supported by EU-funding. Public money without EU funds is the source of 
funding in 19% of the contract solutions. Private funds account for 40% of the contract solutions, 
with market sector-oriented schemes representing 37% and consumer-oriented schemes 
representing 3% of the cases8. Market sector-oriented schemes include all instruments in which 
private actors like companies, civil society organizations, and banks incentivize farmers/foresters 
                                                     
7
 59 case studies were considered, DE4 was excluded from this analysis as no information about financing party is provided. In some 
cases, contract solutions were counted twice because they involve public-private and private-private contracts. 
8
 The figures shown are based on the information provided by the partners. In a narrower sense of the definition, more case studies 




























Figure 15: Composition of the contracting parties in the case 
studies  




to provide AECPGs. Consumer-oriented schemes are mainly marketing approaches that persuade 
the consumer to pay a higher price for an added-value product.  
In summary, there is a 60% to 40% ratio between public and private funding parties. Considering 
the financing parties in relation to the types of contracts, the collective as well as the value chain 
contracts reveal a discernible trend. Almost all value-chain contract solutions are market sector-
oriented schemes, which means that the funding for the contract solutions originates from the 
private sector (12 of 15), in some cases public funding is supporting the project management. The 
majority of collective contract solutions, by contrast, are funded by the government with EU 
funding (17 of 22). Three collective cases are financed by the local government and only two by 
the market. In the other two types of contracts, the financing parties are more equally represented. 
9 of the 21 RB/RO cases are funded by the government with EU-funding and 6 of the 21 without 
EU-funding. The market serves as a financing party for further 8 RB/RO cases. Furthermore, all 
three financing parties appear equally often in land tenure contract solutions. The consumer-
oriented scheme should be considered together with the market sector-oriented schemes because 
of unproper delimitation.  
Classification of the case studies with EU-funding: 
Figure 17 shows that 65% of the EU-
funded contract solutions represented by 
the CONSOLE EU case studies are part of 
the EU countries' rural development 
programmes (RDPs) and these are funded 
through the European agricultural fund for 
rural development (EAFRD), most of 
them under the current funding rules.  In 4 
case studies (18%) the LIFE programme is 
involved. Two cases are a LIFE follow up 
projects (LV2; IRL1). The case study LV1 
is funded with 75% by the Central Baltic 
Sea Region programme 2014-2020, 
belonging to the European Territorial 
Cooperation framework (ETC) (also 
known as Interreg) and being granted 
under the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF).  The German case study DE4 is part of the H2020 project UNISECO. 
Furthermore, the RBPAS (IRL2) is an EC DG ENVI call for tender 2014 pilot project and the 
IRL3 project is funded by a European Innovation Partnership (EIP) Agri-Environment Scheme. 
The CONSOLE contract solutions represented by the case studies are characterised by different 
payment mechanisms aimed at compensating the costs of changing management and stimulating 
the voluntary supply and finally the acceptance of the contract solutions. Figure 18 to Figure 21 
show the different payment mechanisms implemented by the different contract types. The figures 
reveal that in RB/RO and CO/COOP contract solutions incentive payments are the most 
commonly used mechanism. In contrast, in value-chain based contract solutions, payments are 
usually operationalised via the product price. In contract solutions based on land tenure, a broader 
variety of payment mechanisms are implemented, for example, investments, rent, public 
procurement/tenders, or even no payments but access to land is granted. Considering all case 
















Figure 18: RB and RO payment mechanisms       
 
Figure 19: CO and COOP payment mechanisms 
 
Figure 20: VC payment mechanisms 
 
Figure 21: LT payment mechanisms                        
 
3.2 Contract specifications and reasons for success and failure  
 
In order to analyse and describe contract specifications and reasons for success and failure of the 
CONSOLE EU case studies, a qualitative content analysis was carried out according to a 
previously defined coding system that was further extended within the analysis.  
The analysis was carried out contract-type wise, and 
considers 11 result-based, 10 result-oriented, 16 collective, 
5 cooperation, 15 value-chain based and 10 land-tenure 
based contract solutions. Since the contract solutions often 
consist of combinations of contract types (see Figure 5), in 
parts contract solutions are analysed repeatedly for the 
different groups of contract types they belong to. That 
means it can occur that a hybrid case study is analysed e.g. 
in the result-based part and again in the collective part, in 
order to assess all relevant information. In this case, the 
repetition is indicated in the overview table of the analysis.  
The flow chart of the qualitative, contract type-wise 
analysis of contract specifications and reasons for success and failure analysis is presented in 
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• First, a table gives an overview of the case studies assigned to the contract type.  
• Second, a general description of the contract type is presented followed by a short 
descriptive presentation of the individual contract solution. These descriptions were 
inserted to better understand the contract specifications and reasons for success.  
• Third, the contract specifications are described.  
• Fourth, a list of the reasons for success and failure is presented, which has been 
determined by the analysis. 
 
Figure 22: Presentation of the results of the qualitative analysis of contract specifications and reasons for 
success and failure  
3.2.1 Result-based and result-oriented contract solutions 
 Contract description and specifications 
Result-based contract solutions are based on contracts specifying a result rather than prescribing 
the implementation of management measures (e.g. the delivery of a specific AECPG is subject of 
the contracts). A distinction is made between result-based and result-oriented contract solutions. 
In true result-based contract solutions, achieved results serve as a reference parameter for 
payment, which means. Farmers or management bodies are paid according to the achievement of 
certain precisely defined ecosystem/environmental objectives. In result-oriented contract 
solutions, it is sufficient to have a result-orientation specified in the contract, but the land manager 
is not (financially) penalised if there is no visible improvement of an environmental objective 
(during contract term). Thus, the ecological results aren’t necessarily the basis for the payment. 
Nonetheless, the lines between RO and RB are blurred and a clear demarcation is difficult. 
 
In total, 21 of the CONSOLE EU case studies are classified as result-based/result-oriented 
contract solutions. Hereby, 11 cases are assigned to the group of result-based (RB), and 7 to the 
group of result-oriented (RO) contract solutions.  
Moreover, the case studies BE4 and BE1 are assigned to the contract types CO and RO, the case 
study FI3 is assigned to the contract types CO, VC and RO, having result-orientation solely as an 
element among other (more dominant) contract features. Furthermore, there is also a result-based 


























6 of the RB/RO contract solution case studies did undergo an in-depth assessment (indicated in 
column five of the overview tables 3; 5; 7; 9). The results of the second-level analysis are reported 
in the Deliverable 2.3 “Report on European in-depth case studies”.  
 
Ctry  ID Contract  Title 
In-
depth 
AT AT3 RB Result-based Nature Conservation Plan (RNP) Yes 
AT AT4 RB The Humus Program of the Ökoregion Kaindorf Yes 
BE BE3 RB-CO Wildlife Estates Label in Flanders Yes 
DE DE2 RB-VC Organic farming for species diversity  
FR FR2 RB-VC Terres de Sources - Public food order in Brittany, France  
FR FR4 RB-VC 
ECO-METHANE – Rewarding dairy farmers for low GHG  
emissions in France 
Yes 
IRL IRL1 RB-CO BurrenLife Project Yes 
IRL IRL2 RB 
RBAPS - The Result-based Agri-Environment Payment 
Scheme (RBAPS) Pilot in Ireland 
 
IRL IRL3 RB-CO 
BRIDE - Biodiversity Regeneration in a Dairying 
Environment 
 
NL NL3 RB-VC-LT Biodiversity monitor for DAIRY farming Yes 
NL NL4 RB-VC-LT Biodiversity monitor for ARABLE farming   
FR FR5 CO-RB HAMSTER – Collective AECM to restore habitats of the 
European Hamster in Alsace (France) 
 
AT AT2 RO Biodiversity monitoring with farmers  
DE DE1 RO-COOP 
Viticulture on steep slopes creates diversity in the Moselle 
valley 
 
DE DE4 RO-COOP Agro-ecological transition pathways in arable farming  
FI FI2 RO-LT-CO Protected areas of private forests as tourism destination   
FI FI6 RO Nature value bargaining (Luonnonarvokauppa)   
IT IT5 RO Farmers as Custodian of a Territory  




Carbon Market – a marketplace for the restoration of ditched 
peatlands 
Yes 
BE BE4 CO-RO Flemish nature management plan  
BE BE1 CO-RO 
Participation of private landowners to the ecological  
restoration of the Pond area Midden-Limburg through a close  
participation of private and public landowners and a triple E-  
approach in the 3watEr project. 
Yes 
Table 3: Overview table about case studies assigned to the contract type RB/RO, information about 
country, ID, contract, title and whether the case study was additionally analysed as an in-depth study.   
(case studies described in grey indicate cases where result-orientation is solely as an element among 
other (more dominant) contract features) 
In the following, the RESULT-BASED case studies are shortly described: 
➢ AT3: In the period 2014-2020, under the Austrian Agri-Environmental-Program ÖPUL, 
a sub-measure ‘Result-based Nature Conservation Plan (RNP)’ has been integrated into 
the measure “Nature conservation”. In contrast to conventional ÖPUL measures, the RNP 
defines environmental objectives to be reached as basis for 2nd Pillar payments, and not 
detailed management prescriptions. 
➢ AT4: In the ‘Humus program’, farmers voluntarily aim to build up humus in agricultural 
soils, sequester CO2 and receive a fee per ton of stored CO2. Management decisions are 
up to the farmers. Companies finance soil carbon storage by buying CO2 certificates 
(carbon market mechanism). 
➢ BE3: The ‘Wildlife Estates’ label has been developed to acknowledge exemplary 
management of European territories. It targets (mostly private) landowners and managers 




for their commitment to sustainable wildlife and habitat management (labelling 
mechanism). 
➢ DE2: In the initiative ‘Organic farming for species diversity’, organic farms have the 
possibility to select measures fitting best to foster wild flora and fauna out of a menu. A 
certification scheme qualifies the farmers for selling their organic products in retail with 
premium price. 
➢ FR2: In ‘Terres de Sources’, farmers located in the drinking water supply area of the city 
of Rennes can contract for the supply of public canteens. Only farmers committing 
themselves to improve their farm environmental practices using the IDEA method based 
on scoring system with 42 indicators can subscribe to this public contract.9  
➢ FR4: In the ‘ECO-METHANE’ program, farmers commit to provide a monthly analysis 
of the fatty acid profile of their milk and to feed their cattle with rich-omega 3 feed intake 
(mainly through grass feed). Methane emissions of livestock are derived from milk 
analysis. Farmers are payed for GHG emissions saved, based on a regional reference. 
➢ IRL1: The ‘BurrenLife programme’ works with farmers in the Burren area to achieve 
specific environmental outcomes, rewarded by payments, and also makes funds available 
for farmers to invest in self-selected, but pre-approved, conservation projects. 
Environmental targets are set and monitored by farm advisors, performance is scored and 
payments are provided based on the scoring system. 
➢ IRL2: To test how result-based agri-environment schemes could promote biodiversity 
and work in differing landscapes, the EU Commission provided 70% funding for a 
‘Result-based Agri-Environment Payment Scheme’ (RBAPS) pilot. Two regions were 
selected in Ireland. Ecologists worked with 35 participating farmers to improve the 
biodiversity status of their farms. Farmers were paid on a per hectare basis conditional on 
a score achieved on a 1 to 10 scale. 
➢ IRL3: ‘BRIDE’ is a result-based biodiversity project based in low-land intensively 
managed farmland. Farmers agree to a biodiversity management plan for their farm, 
where they agree to carry out up to 10 biodiversity measures. Payment is linked to their 
performance on these agreed measures. 
➢ NL3: The ‘Biodiversity Monitor for dairy farming’ is a result-based methodology to 
measure and reward the performance for biodiversity (including soil, landscape, 
environment and climate) on dairy farms in the Netherlands. The scores per farm on 
biodiversity-stimulating key performance indicators (KPIs) can be used as the basis for 
new revenue models. In this way, ecosystem-based dairy farming can be stimulated. 
➢ NL4: The ‘Biodiversity Monitor for arable farming’ is a result-based methodology to 
measure and reward the performance for biodiversity (including soil, landscape, 
environment and climate) on arable farms in the Netherlands. The scores per farm on 
biodiversity-stimulating key performance indicators (KPIs) can be used as the basis for 
rewarding efforts at farm level. In this way, ecosystem-based arable farming can be 
stimulated. 
 
The short descriptions of the result-based contract solutions show that many of the case studies 
target biodiversity, but also climate action and overall sustainability efforts are covered by result-
based contracts. To measure the increases in the AECPGs, indicators are needed and different 
approaches are developed to meet this challenge. Direct measurement, hybrid approaches, scoring 
systems, and key performance indicators are used to design suitable contract solutions and to 
reconcile a variety of factors (farmers, implementation, biodiversity). BE3 can be described as an 
outlier among the result-based contract solutions, as it represents a labelling rather than a payment 
mechanism. 
 
Short descriptions of the RESULT-ORIENTED case studies: 
                                                     
9 In this case, the difference between practice-based and result-based is questionable since the IDEA method is mainly 




➢ AT2: In the program ‘Biodiversity monitoring with farmers’, around 700 farms 
throughout Austria monitor rare plants and animals on their meadows and pastures in 
order to better understand the link between abundance of species and different farming 
practices. 
➢ DE1: Measures ‘promoting species diversity in viticulture on steep and extremely steep 
slopes’ have been developed in collaboration with winegrowers. At the same time these 
measures contribute to the preservation of the traditional cultural landscape along the 
river Moselle. 
➢ DE4: Suitable strategies and incentive mechanisms for agro-ecological transitions are co-
constructed with a local Multi-Actor Platform (MAP), putting a particular focus on result-
oriented approaches. Participatory decision support tools are applied to assess the current 
environmental, economic and social situation of arable farms in Lower Saxony. The 
outcome is used to identify potentials for agro-ecological improvements. 
➢ FI2: In the case of ‘Protected areas of private forests’ in Kuusamo, visually attractive 
protected areas are uncovered from private forests. Local nature-based tourism 
enterprises are offered a possibility to use these spots, nature trails leading to them and 
potentially existing facilities with their customers. Enterprises make an agreement with 
the forest owner to compensate the use. 
➢ FI6: ‘Nature value bargaining’ was a voluntary and temporary (10-20 years) biodiversity 
protection instrument in which forest owners got payment for maintaining and/or 
increasing biodiversity in a certain forest area within their forest holding. The solution 
was tested in a pilot project phase (2002-2007) when the different protection instruments 
for METSO program (biodiversity protection programme for Southern Finland) were 
developed. 
➢ IT5: The contract solution ‘Farmers as Custodian of a Territory’ is designed to 
compensate farmers for monitoring and for interventions to control flood risks and to 
improve the management of river basins. The contract represents a case of outsourcing 
environmental and public goods services to the farmer. In other words, the public agency 
pays the farmers for the monitoring and maintenance of the river basin, the prevention 
from flood risks and the provision of other environmental goods. 
➢ LV3: The ‘Bauska nature park’ is a good practice example for the motivation of 
environmentally friendly activities supported by the local authority. The local authority 
pays for tidy-up activities in the Bauska Nature park.  
➢ FI3: Carbon Market (Hiilipörssi) is an online donation service designed to reduce carbon 
emissions and increase carbon storage by restoring ditched peatlands. It is targeted to 
consumers and companies who want to decrease their carbon footprint. The landowner 
offers the ditched peatland for restoration to its natural state as carbon stock. Investments, 
actually donations, from private persons and enterprises provide capital that enables 
restoring actions. The landowner commits to leave the peatland untouched and transform 
it into private protection area before restoration starts. 
 
In contrast to the result-based contracts, in the CONSOLE result-oriented contract solutions the 
payments are not solely oriented towards the provision of a public good. Results, which are used 
as a basis for payments, can be the number of visitors (e.g. the tourism company pays 5 Euro per 
visitor) (FI2), compensation for monitoring (AT2; IT5), for executed tasks (IT5; DE1), and for 
tidy-up activities (LV3). 
Implementation mechanisms:  
Result-based and result-oriented contract solutions are still relatively new forms of contracts, 
which are until now rarely integrated into common AES formats. The CONSOLE case studies 
reveal that many different ways (projects, programs) are used (and tested) to implement this 




Implementation of result-based contract solutions: 
One way to implement result-based contract solutions is to integrate them into the national Agri-
Environmental-Program. This is the case in AT3, where the “Result-based Nature Conservation 
Plan (RNP)” has been integrated into the AES measure “Nature conservation”. Among the 
CONSOLE case studies, the RNP is the only result-based contract solution that is fully 
implemented via integration into the national Agri-Environmental-Program. Some result-based 
contract solutions were initiated through pilot projects (AT3, DE2, IRL2). In IRL2, for example, 
the EU Commission provided 70% funding for the RBAPS Pilot, to test how result-based agri-
environment schemes could operate over wider areas and in differing landscapes. Also, contracts 
directly concluded with the local or national government are an option. This is the case in the 
BurrenLife Programme (IRL1), where farmers sign a contract with the Irish Department of 
Agriculture, Food and the Marine. The BurrenLife Programme has evolved over an almost 20-
year period using various EU funding sources. In the case of ‘Terre de Sources’ (FR2), the 
contractual solution was implemented by the local government through a public tender. The 
result-based landscape biodiversity project BRIDE (IRL3) is implemented and funded by an EIP 
Agri-Environment Scheme. Some of the private result-based contracts were developed and started 
by associations. The association “Verein Ökoregion Kaindorf” developed the “Humus-Program” 
intending to improve the soil quality and store CO2 using the carbon market. The association Bleu-
Blanc-Coeur in the case FR4 is the coordinator of the Eco-Methane program. Another possibility 
is that the contract solution has been established by a multi-stakeholder coalition including actors 
of the civil society. In DE2 (which is also a pilot-project), WWF Germany, a federation of organic 
farming and a retailer have started the initiative together. In NL3, the Biodiversity Monitor for 
dairy farming has been established by WWF-Netherlands, Duurzame Zuivelketen (including 
FrieslandCampina – the largest dairy cooperative in NL) and Rabobank (largest agricultural 
financer in NL). 
Implementation of result-oriented contract solutions:  
Also result-oriented solutions can be integrated into the national Agri-Environmental-Program. 
This is for example the case for the program “Farmers keep an eye on plants and animals!" (AT2), 
being part of Austria’s program for rural development since the period 2007-13 and also in 2014-
20. Implemented in the form of a project/ or part of a project are the cases DE1, DE4, and FI2. 
The Moselle project (DE1) is one of the three components of the project "Lebendige 
Agrarlandschaften - Lively agriculture landscapes" with the German farmers’ association DBV 
as a lead. Also, the contractual solutions represented by FI2 is implemented within a project 
(Kuusamo project). Yet, the project is based on the METSO-program, a biodiversity protection 
program for the forests of Southern Finland. The contractual solution “Nature value bargaining” 
(FI6) was also tested as a METSO pilot programme 2002-2007: However, after the pilot period, 
the instrument was abandoned and replaced with more traditional AES due to EU-level legislative 
reasons. DE2 represents a case study of the H2020 research project UNISECO (DE4). In the 
initiative “Farmers as Custodian of a Territory” (IT5), an authority (mountain community) 
responsible to manage water risks in mountain areas, took the initiative for the contract solution. 
Also, in LV3 the local authority is in charge of the initiative Bauska nature Park. Likewise, the 
result-based Humus-program (AT4), also FI3 is implemented as a private carbon market initiative 
founded by the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation.  
Farm/forestry types/systems:  
Table 4 gives an overview of the farm/forestry types/systems addressed by the RB/RO contract 
solutions. The table shows that result-based contract solutions are implemented in a variety of 





ID Contract  Title Farm types addressed 
AT3 RB RNP All farm types, but mostly grassland 
AT4 RB Humus Program  All farm types, but mostly arable farms 
BE3 RB-CO Wildlife Estates Label  Farm and forestry (all types)  
DE2 RB-VC 
Organic farming for species 
diversity 
Organic farms (mixed) 
FR2 RB-VC Terres de Sources  All farm types 
FR4 RB-VC ECO-METHANE  Dairy cow farms 
IRL1 RB-CO BurrenLife Programme 
Producers of suckler beef (herd size 30-40 cows) – 
grassland  
IRL2 RB RBAPS  High nature value grassland  
IRL3 RB-CO BRIDE  
Farms from different sectors (dairying, beef, equine, tillage, 
sheep) and at different levels of intensity (ranging from 
intensive to extensive farming systems) 
NL3 RB-VC-LT Biodiversity monitor dairy Dairy farming 
NL4 RB-VC-LT Biodiversity monitor arable  Arable farming 
FR5 CO-RB HAMSTER – Collective AECM to 
restore habitats of the European 
Hamster in Alsace (France) 
Arable farming 
AT2 RO 
Biodiversity monitoring with 
farmers 
Mostly grassland farms with valuable nature conservation 
areas 





FI2 RO-LT-CO Protected areas of private forests  Forests 
FI6 RO Nature value bargaining  Forests 
IT5 RO Farmers as Custodian of Territory No specific farm type 




Carbon Market Hiilipörssi 
Forest 
BE4 CO-RO Flemish nature management plan Mixed and forest 
BE1 CO-RO 3watEr project. Forest, peatland 
Table 4: Farm/forestry types/systems addressed by the contract solutions 
 
Reasons for the implementation of result-based/result-oriented contract solutions  
For the CONSOLE case study sample, several reasons have led to the introduction of result-
based/result-oriented contracts:  
One reason for the introduction of such “new” schemes are the attempt to overcome shortcomings 
of top-down action-oriented contracts: A first shortcoming might be, that action-oriented 
contracts often miss to explain protection objectives to the land managers and therefore are 
incapable to initiate a sustainable “change of mind” and informed awareness-building process 
which is necessary to sustainably guarantee long-term provision of AECPGs. This is notably 
reflected in the case of AT3: In Austria, “classical” contractual nature conservation is 
predominantly designed to be action-oriented. Concrete management measures are defined on 
valuable areas by authorities in coordination with the farmers. The farmers are however often not 
well informed about protection objectives and expected results, therefore no process of learning 
can settle. In contrast, in the AT3 RNP, the focus lies on the nature conservation objectives in the 
contractual areas. These objectives are developed in close cooperation with the farmers. 
Management measures to reach objectives are not prescribed and can be determined by the 
farmers themselves. Besides reaching the environmental objectives, in this way the RNP intends 
to increase farmers’ flexibility, supports awareness building and the building of social capital. 
AT2 underpins the assertions from AT3: Here, awareness building and the creation of social 
capital are the main objectives of the biodiversity monitoring with farmers. A second shortcoming 
of classical action-oriented contract solutions might be the insufficient recognition of specific 
regional, natural basic conditions. The BurrenLife programme (IRL1) was mainly implemented 
because the traditional agri-environmental schemes could not efficiently address the 




region. Also the RBAPS-pilot (IRL2) took an approach of better regional adaptation by aiming 
to test how result-based agri-environmental schemes could work over wider areas and in differing 
landscapes. The bottom-up development of transition pathways together with stakeholders in the 
UNISECO-project (DE4) tries to overcome generalisation by better understanding current 
(regional) sustainability issues and barriers for implementing agro-ecological approaches. In FI6, 
the development of the nature value bargaining solution was also affected by the experiences 
gained in the Natura 2000 process, where the top-down approach and poor informing of forest 
owners led to conflicts. As a whole, state authorities together with local actors were active in 
driving and developing new and more acceptable solutions. 
The objective and the reason for the development of the “Biodiversity Monitor” (NL3 and NL4) 
is to make biodiversity-enhancing performance on dairy and arable farms measurable – and 
visible. Here, in parts social pressure is a reason for introducing result-based schemes which can 
be used to directly compare the ecological performance of farms, but also to increase the 
reputation of agriculture.  
Another reason for the introduction of new schemes is the ongoing deterioration of specific 
(single) AECPGs, or to react to a situation where the environmental situation has already become 
problematic, also for agricultural/forestry production. AT4 and FR4, for example, aim to 
significantly reduce CO2 emissions and to respond to climate change by sequestrating CO2 in the 
soils and by reducing methane emissions. The conditions that led to the BRIDE project (IRL3), 
as well as to the solutions represented by DE1 and DE2 were the common recognition that 
biodiversity, particularly on intensive farms or in vineyards, was decreasing. In the program 
“Farmers as Custodians of Territory”(IT5) the contracts came to life as a solution to better control 
flood risks and to improve the management of river basins.  
The background of the implementation of the FI2 Kuusamo cooperation network is a little bit 
different. It evolved from the fact that there are several, unknown, attractive spots in private 
forests that are already protected via METSO-program, which were assumed to be beautiful 
places to visit for outsiders too and therefore suited for an RO scheme directly activating payments 
from visitors.  
Indicators and measurement - Mechanism in result-based contract solutions:  
The elaboration of the right indicators, as well as the measurement of results represent a 
remarkable challenge in the design of result-based contract solutions. In the CONSOLE case 
study examples, 4 different mechanisms were used to ensure feasible and reliable measurement. 
The measurement of objectives is done either by direct measurement (e.g. using technical tools), 
by scoring systems linked to environmental improvement, by the development of key 
performance indicators, or by hybrid approaches. The design of these individual mechanisms can 
however be diverse.  
Direct measurement:  
Measurement of the amount of CO2 sequestration in the Humus program (AT4) is based on an 
initial soil sampling at the start of the contract (by a certified civil engineer and accredited national 
laboratory). During the sequestration period, farmers set their own measures to increase the humus 
content in their soils. After a period of three to seven years (according to the farmer’s needs), 
humus content is determined again by a second soil sampling. An increase in humus content is 
converted into additional tons of CO2 stored in soil.  
In the EcoMethane program (FR4), each farmer individually commits to monthly provide a milk 
analysis to the association Bleu-Blanc-Coeur. The milk analysis provides the composition in fatty 




Scoring/credit point system:  
In RBAPS (IRL2), a common design approach was used to quantify the assessment of ecological 
quality across the two regions and five measures. The assessments relied on the use of result 
indicators which are proxies employed to quantify the quality of the biodiversity target. Measure- 
specific result indicators were identified and trialled for their fairness, robustness and reliability 
in assessing the quality of the farmland for the measure they were most suited to provide and to 
indicate general environmental condition. It was extremely important that the result indicators 
were both linked to the biodiversity target and feasible for the farmer to deliver. The RBAPS pilot 
scores were designed to reflect the variation in the quality of the selected biodiversity target, 
which was assessed by totalling the points awarded for result indicators and translating them into 
a scoring scale from 0 (very low) to 10 (very high).  
The nature protection certification in DE2 is based on a credit point system with a broad range of 
over 100 measures. Its central element is a catalogue of measures with credits allocated to each 
of them. Together with a specialised nature protection advisor, the participating farmers choose 
the measures that are the most suitable and can be best integrated into their agricultural production 
system. The whole farm with all its land and the surrounding landscape elements is eligible. If the 
farmer reaches a minimum of credit points, he/she gets a price supplement from a retailer for 
selected products (pork, beef, lamb, and potatoes). The farmer is compensated for his/her nature 
protection efforts through the higher priced premium organic product sold with a particular label.  
The contractual solution FR2 aims to favour more sustainable farming systems using the IDEA 
method. The IDEA method assesses farm multi-performances (the overall farm performance) 
using 42 indicators which cover the three dimensions of sustainability (agroecology, sociology 
and economics). These indicators include biodiversity, autonomy and low use of inputs, natural 
resources preservation (soil, water and energy, economic viability, local development and circular 
economy, food, employment and labour quality). The results are based on the improvement of 
agricultural practices using 21 indicators out of the 42 provided in the IDEA method. The results 
are only indirectly linked to the supply of a public good (here improvement of drinking water). If 
no improvements are made, the contract and the supply of catering can be suspended. 
 
Hybrid approaches:  
The BurrenLife Programme (IRL1) is a hybrid approach whereby participating farmers are 
rewarded annually for their environmental performance while also having access to a fund to 
carry out self-nominated ‘conservation support actions’ to help improve biodiversity over time. 
The result-based payment is complementary. Each farmer’s payment depends on the score they 
receive in their assessment on a per hectare basis. The scoring system, underpinned by evidence-
based information, helps to create a very robust, detailed and objective system. The scoring is 
conducted on site by the farm advisor each year, scoring results are validated by the project team 
and submitted to the Department of Agriculture for payment.  
The RNP (AT3) represents a dual system of 1.) environmental area objectives, on the basis of 
which farmers primarily orientate their farming methods and 2.) control criteria, which are used 
primarily as a control instrument for the technical control service and the fulfilment of which 
represents the basis for payment. Both are farm-individually developed by ecologists together 
with the farmers, and fixed in a farm-individual logbook, containing information on objectives, 
illustrations of species, maps of appearance, suggestions of management measures as well as a 
section for documentation of management measures and progress as regards the target set.  
In BRIDE (IRL3) a Biodiversity Management Plan (BMP) is drawn up by the project ecologist 
for each farm in consultation with each farmer. The farmers have to carry out a minimum number 




skylark plots, creation of permanent ponds, native woodlands, winter stubble, nest boxes and bat 
boxes, annual biodiversity plot, invasive species control, multi-species grassland, riparian buffer 
strip creation, tree lines etc. A farmer will receive a once-off capital payment for work carried 
out, e.g., fencing a hedgerow or excavating a pond, but annual payments will be made on the 
biodiversity quality of the habitats on the farm. All of the habitats included in the BMA will be 
scored and a quality mark given accordingly. An independent ecologist is also available to give a 
second opinion if a farmer wishes to appeal the result. 
Key performance indicators:  
In the biodiversity monitor for dairy farming (NL3), the biodiversity-enhancing performance per 
dairy farm is measured with an integrated set of 7 Key Performance Indicators (KPIs): permanent 
grassland (%), protein from own farm/region (%), soil nitrogen surplus (kg/ha), ammonia 
emissions (kg/ha), greenhouse gas emissions (kg/ha and kg/kg milk), herb-rich grassland (%) and 
nature conservation management & landscape elements (%). These KPIs are selected based on 
multiple criteria, including their scientifically proven relation with biodiversity, and the fact that 
performance can be influenced in the short term by taking measures on the farm. 
Also in the biodiversity monitor for arable farming (NL4), the biodiversity-enhancing 
performance per arable farm is measured with an integrated set of Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs). The set of KPIs is currently (spring 2020) still under construction, but will likely include 
indicators on topics covering crop diversity, emissions, inputs, soil management, and nature and 
landscape elements on the farm. These KPIs will be selected based on multiple criteria, including 
their scientifically proven relation with biodiversity, connection to existing data systems (to 
minimize extra administration), while ensuring that performance can be influenced in the short 
term by implementing on farm measures.  
Indicators and measurement - Mechanism in result-oriented contract solutions:  
The CONSOLE case studies representing result-oriented contract solutions reveal that 
alternatives to ecological results are used as a basis for payments. For example, results in the 
CONSOLE RO contract solutions are number of visitors (FI2), compensation for monitoring 
activities (AT2; IT5), executed tasks (IT5; DE1, LV3). 
Compensation for monitoring activities  
The AT2 case study represents a contract solution where the farmers get paid for carrying out 
monitoring activities. If farmers want to participate, they must get in contact with the project team 
and register. An ecologist visits the farm and demonstrates which special and valuable  species 
can be found on the meadows.  The selected indicator species are observed and monitored 
annually. Monitoring observations and management measures are reported on an online reporting 
portal. Farmers are paid a compensation for their monitoring activities.   
Compensation for executed tasks  
In the DE1 case study in Mosel valley, the winegrowers get financial compensation for the proper 
implementation of the measures agreed (e.g. interrow and boarder greening, establishment of 
floristical hotspots, etc.), as well as for the monitoring. 
In the ‘farmers as custodians of a territory’ initiative (IT5), the contract is an agreement between 
the Union of Municipalities of Serchio Valley and 27 farmers selected based on two criteria:  
proximity to the water bodies and the capability to undertake necessary actions. Formally, there 
is a public call asking for farmers’ willingness to be involved in the project. The agreement 
includes a description of actions to be taken in their managed area as well as the right of first 
refusal for further activities when needed. The deal includes a fixed amount for monitoring 
activities and a variable amount based on agreed actions and for new actions (based on the right 
of first refusal or fiduciary piecework). The payment rewards the number of actions. Each action 




In ‘Bauska Nature Park’ (LV3), the landowners can apply for a reduction of the real estate tax in 
exchange for tidy up the bordering territories, to improve sidewalks, construction or 
reconstruction of streets, children’s and sports grounds, water parks, sewerage systems etc. 
Number of visitors  
In the initiative ‘Protected areas of private forests’ (FI2), forest owners and nature-based tourism 
enterprises make an agreement about the use of the spot, nature trail and the services included 
(e.g. fireplaces, parking places). The enterprise pays the forest owner according to the agreement. 
In the example agreement, the compensation is based on the number of persons who visit the spot 
(e.g. 5 euros per person). However, the parties of the agreement can freely decide the 
compensation level and the basis for payment (lump sum, per person). 
Others  
In the nature value bargaining contract solution (FI6), the forest areas that were contracted needed 
to meet certain characteristics. The offered areas were inventoried by forest/biology professionals. 
First, the forest area in question was required to represent certain important habitat types (groves, 
forests with considerable amounts of dead wood component, forests located near small water 
bodies, certain peatland habitats, traditional biotopes (altogether 11)). In addition, the forests 
presenting these habitats needed to contain certain structural characteristics that were important 
and predefined too. Finally, the price demand from the owner needed to match with the 
willingness to pay from authority. In Nature Value Bargaining, the subsidy was partly based on 
the existing and potential (future) biodiversity values of the forest area offered for protection. 
Controls and monitoring of compliance in result-based and result-oriented contract 
solutions - some examples 
Besides the development of indicators and the development of systems for measurement, of 
course the correctness of the measurement itself, and the controls for compliance are crucial for 
successful implementation and fair payment in result-based/result-oriented schemes. Particularly 
the in-depth studies showed, that often well-trained staff is needed to carry out the controls and 
monitoring of compliance and the measurement of results. Following are some examples from 
the CONSOLE case study sample on how this task is carried out. 
 
➢ DE2: The participating farms are controlled annually if they have successfully 
implemented the chosen measures on their farm. Currently the nature protection advisors 
are controlling whether the necessary credit points are obtained and certify the organic 
farms. In the future, it is foreseen to have the mandatory controls for organic farming 
back-to-back with the nature protection certification. 
➢ FR2: An initial and a final diagnosis are done by one of the three following organisations 
(Chamber of agriculture, Agro bio or Adage) to give a farm score using the IDEA method. 
Once a year, the Collectivité Eau du Bassin Rennais (EBR) checks the planned 
improvements made by each farm, pending the implementation of the labelling process. 
➢ In the humus program (AT4), results of soil carbon sequestration are measured and 
controlled by soil sampling. Each field registered for the program is subject to minimum 
1 soil sampling at the beginning of the sequestration phase, which is carried out by a 
certified civil engineer. Soil samples are analysed for soil organic carbon content, total 
nitrogen, pHCaCl2, CAL-extractable phosphorus and potassium by the Department for 
Soil Health and Plant Nutrition, Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety (AGES). In 
addition, samples are analysed according to the method of Albrecht/Kinsey for 
exchangeable cations, total sulphur, available and total phosphorus as well as a range of 
trace elements. The first soil sampling determines baseline humus levels (25 GPS-located 
samples per field, mixed and analysed as a compound sample). A second sampling 
(success sampling) is conducted within three to seven years after the initial sampling in 
the same manner to quantify changes in humus content. From the increase in humus, the 
total amount of CO2 sequestered is calculated. The farmer can then claim a success fee of 




the absolute price per ton is not guaranteed). After receiving the fee, the humus farmer 
has to guarantee the level of build-up humus for five years. This is controlled by a third 
sampling (control sampling). In case an increase in humus above levels from the success 
sampling is measured, farmers can claim further success fees and the program is 
prolonged for another five years. Decreases in humus content can lead to partial or 
complete refunding of the success fee. All soil samples are paid by the farmers.The 
example of the RNP (AT3) reveals the importance of co-developing measurable 
indicators together with the controlling units. In RNP the institution being involved right 
from the beginning was the national control authority (AgrarMarktAustria; AMA), which 
particularly provided inputs for the design of measurable and, consequently, controllable 
indicators. AMA was fundamentally involved in designing the mixed approach of area 
and control indicators, which finally enabled the integration of the RNP into the RDP. 
The involvement of the national control authority from the beginning is perceived as the 
main success factor of the RNP, in case of a transfer of such schemes to other countries, 
this integration would be recommended by the experts. 
 
Payment setting for result-based and result-oriented contracts:  
In IRL2 the payment structure aimed to achieve a balance between incentivising farmers to deliver 
the highest possible score in their particular farm setting, while giving a clear signal that the 
delivery of higher quality also results in a higher reward. Payment rates for the low-medium 
quality scores were set at a level sufficient to cover costs of farmers’ participation in the scheme 
while payment increments were created to incentivise further progression towards the delivery of 
higher quality outputs. Tiered payment levels provide a financial incentive to the farmer to deliver 
the highest quality environmental product in their particular farm setting. The results showed that 
tiered payment structures linking the quality to the payment rate can incentivise change in farmer 
attitudes and management and bring about benefits for biodiversity targets.  
For FI6 the level of payment was defined in negotiation processes between authorities and 
farmers, and it depended on the biodiversity values of the stand, opportunity costs as well as 
farmer’s negotiation skills. 
In NL3 a good performance on the integrated set of KPIs can be linked with financial rewards 
from multiple stakeholders. The Biodiversity Monitor provides the scientifically substantiated 
methodology to measure biodiversity-enhancing performance per farm, while contracting parties 
decide about how they reward the farmer. The best performing dairy farmers who comply with 
the certification standards of ‘On the way to Planet Proof dairy’ (which includes the KPIs), receive 
a higher milk price. The bank involved (Rabobank) is piloting with green financing funding to 
reward well-performing farmers with a loan interest discount. Drenthe administration runs a 
program which grants financial rewards to good performing local farmers. 
 Reasons for success and failure  
Through the joint analysis of the result-based and result-oriented agreements, 11 reasons for 
success and 3 reasons for failure were identified. Something is considered a reason for success if 
there is an indication of a benefitting influence in the contract solutions and if this influence is 
found in more than one contract solution.  
Reason for success #1: High level of available knowledge support (e.g. specialized nature 
protection advisors...) and training for the farmers 
RB/RO contracts require more knowledge from farmers and for this reason, successful 
implementation is often linked to special training or advice. Nature conservation advisors are 
particularly often involved to bring environmental aspects closer to farmers and help them to 
improve the environmental situation on the field. Nature protection advisors or ecologists are for 
example playing a decisive role in the cases DE2, DE1, AT3, IRL3, and AT2. All five cases have 




solution. In general, the nature protection advisor assesses the farm and identifies which valuable 
species are present. Existing nature deficits are discussed and solutions are elaborated together 
with the farmers. The advisor agrees with the farmer which measures are suitable on which fields 
or neighbouring areas (DE2, AT3). In AT2, ecologists teach the farmers in the initial phase of 
participation, how to monitor biodiversity in grassland. They show the farmers rare plants and 
animal species on their farmland that are worth protecting. They train the farmers to observe, 
count, and document according to a certain monitoring design. In IRL1, farmers who apply to the 
scheme, have to attend an initial induction meeting and then elaborate a farm plan for 
environmental improvements with their designated farm advisor. In FI6 the forest owners could 
ask for advice e.g. from the Forest Management Associations. The association helps forest owners 
in their forest management decision-making and operations. In IRL2 also training plays an 
important role: “annual training was offered by the project team to participating farmers over the 
two years of farmer contracts. A half-day classroom setting was used to present the scheme 
concept, its comparison with more familiar management-based schemes and the RBAPS Pilot 
scheme aims. The classroom session was followed by a half-day of field-training for each measure 
which focused on the use and understanding of the applicable scoring assessment, the rationale 
for the results indicators and discussion on optimal management to achieve the best possible 
outcome (and payment). Most farmers participated willingly at the farmer training events, with 
some requesting additional training as they found it both helpful and enjoyable”. Support is also 
crucial in case studies that do not focus on biodiversity. In AT4, for example, the Humus-Program 
provides practical principles for humus accumulation in soil and suggests best-practices including 
use of cover crops, no-till practices, intercropping and compost application. In NL4 the 
complexity of the method is mentioned as a threat, to address this threat information exchange 
and practical education is mentioned as being essential to make the contract work.  
Reason for success #2: Flexibility in timing, the choice of practices and measures 
In result-based and result-oriented contract solutions, often a higher degree of flexibility is 
emphasised. Mostly, flexibility in connection with result-based/result-oriented schemes means 
that there is freedom of the timing of certain measures being carried out, and also of which 
measures are being carried out. The freedom of choice remains with the farmers. DE1 for example 
is action-based in a certain sense, but freedom is given about timing and the exact practices to be 
applied in view of establishing and maintaining native plants. Also AT3 reports more flexibility 
in choosing and implementing management activities. Farmers see and record the results of their 
management in the fields and can decide which management activities they choose. In IRL1, 
where farmers sign a five-year plan, flexibility in implementing nature conservation measures is 
given. AT4 does not contain any prescribed and obligatory management measures. Farmers can 
freely and flexibly decide on management measures to increase humus content. In DE2, flexibility 
is given due to the free choice out of a catalogue of measures. Farmer can choose from more than 
100 nature protection measures for arable land, grassland and landscape elements. A credit point 
system provides information about the effectiveness of each measure in protecting or promoting 
species and habitats. This freedom in deciding how, what and when to take action leads to an 
increase of “ownership” by the farmers and can result in a higher degree of innovation and 
satisfaction.  
Reason for success #3: Farmers’ knowledge (knowledge exchange)  
Considering farmers' knowledge and priorities can have a positive influence on the design of the 
measure itself (DE3). In addition, farmers' level of knowledge can be considered and advice can 
be tailored to this. Some case studies also report the positive effect of sharing knowledge between 
the advisor and the farmer, allowing both to increase their knowledge and creating a relationship 
of equals (IT6). The knowledge gain thanks to long-term collaborations between the advisor and 
the farmer is also highlighted in DE2. Farmers’ knowledge of environmental issues can also play 




in the selection of the farms so that they were not overstrained with the RNP measure at the 
beginning. Also, by choosing the measures that are the most suitable and can be best integrated 
into their agricultural production, the farmers’ point of view and knowledge is considered (DE2). 
On the contrary, experts in AT3 stated, that in a broader approach, where not all of the potentially 
participating farmers are interested in biodiversity and ecology, farmers may fear that they will 
not be able to achieve their goals due to a lack of knowledge, consequently limiting the potential 
size of a contract solution.  
Reason for success #4: Co-development/co-design 
The farmers’ point of view should be taken into account already in the process of developing the 
program. In IRL1, co-creation was named as an important success factor: “Although the program 
was born from a Ph.D. project, it respected farmer’s ideas and their role in finding solutions”. In 
IRL2, farmers’ attitudes, understanding, and criticisms of the approach were explored through a 
series of systematic questionnaires and interviews, providing valuable insight into how result-
based approaches could appeal to the wider farming community, thus informing the better design 
of future programs. Also, in DE1 measures promoting species diversity in viticulture on steep and 
extremely steep slopes have been developed in collaboration with the winegrowers. In IRL3, 
where a team of local farmers initiated the project, they have recognised that a result-based 
scheme that gives autonomy and flexibility to the farmer would be more effective.  
Reason for success #5: Individualisation  
A farmer-centered approach with individual objectives, individual adjustments of measures, and 
consideration of the local situation increases acceptance and is one reason for success. In case of 
some of the result-based/result-oriented contract solutions presented by the CONSOLE EU case 
studies, individualisation goes rather far and reaches even beyond the freedom of choice of 
management measures: In the RNP in AT3, environmental objectives are defined plot-
individually by ecologists together with the farmers, whereby even farmers’ attitude towards 
species worth of protection is taken into account. The interviewed experts stated that setting 
objectives which are definitely not supported by the farmers (e.g. the protection of poisonous 
snakes) are counterproductive. Also in IRL3 where the local environmental situation is 
challenging due to the unique landscape, on each farm a individual farm plan is developed for 
environmental improvements with the designated farm advisor. This makes it possible to respond 
well to the local situation and find appropriate solutions. For the case of the individualisation of 
management measures on the farms, in the case of DE1 it is concluded that: “Individual 
adjustment of the measures allows aligning the nature protection aspects with the production 
needs”.  
Reason for success #6: Building of social and cultural capital (community, innovation, 
rewards) 
‘Learning by doing’ was another factor of success in result-based/result-oriented contract 
solutions. According to the experts’ statements in the BurrenLife programme case study (IRL1): 
“the project demonstrated in real-time what ‘conservation farming’ looked like and proved that it 
can improve agricultural efficiency and performance (e.g. reducing input costs and/or increasing 
stocking levels). This was a lesson that surprised some farmers and engaged many more”.  
Learning by observing was also reported in DE1, where some winegrowers take advantage of the 
monitoring activities to get emblematic species better known in and near their vineyards. In AT3, 
the educational aspect for the farmers is very high and this can lead to a long-term behavioural 
change. Furthermore, the farmers see and record the results of their management in the fields and 
can decide which management activities they choose. The farmers better understand the 
connection between their acting and the influence on nature. In IRL3 and AT4 the building of 
cultural capital was highlighted. In the IRL3 case study it was stated that “the project has shown 




environmental, economic and social benefits. The specific local nature of the project has united 
the local community and generated goodwill and pride in the area. It is also widely recognised 
outside the region as an innovative approach”. AT4 has specifically implied social components 
(awards, network, training), and farmers who build up humus get a cheque handed over at a public 
event with many other farmers. This public recognition encourages other farmers to participate 
as well, while the humus farmer is motivated to continue. Furthermore, a network among the 
farmers, a so-called ‘Humus community’ is promoted in the form of a regulars' table, where 
farmers exchange information and support each other.  
Reason for success #7: The right people (from the region)  
In some of the result-based/result-oriented CONSOLE EU contract solutions, individual persons 
or a group of people play a decisive role in the success of the contract solution through their 
commitment – and their origin. The right people can significantly influence the success of the 
contract measures, especially when introducing new contract solutions. In IRL1, a team of four 
locally-based staff was appointed to run the project, some with extensive research experience in 
the Burren, which allowed the team, and the project, to get off on the right foot, with a good level 
of trust and credibility. In AT2, regional project representatives are involved: “All over Austria 
farmers particularly committed to biodiversity monitoring are available to answer questions by 
other participants and introduce and advertise for the project in their region. The representatives 
organize guided tours on their own meadows or on other farms and they organize lessons in 
schools in their federal state”. The importance of strong regional actors is also confirmed in IRL3: 
“The project has strong farmer leadership that is local and has arisen out of the intensive dairy 
sector. This gives the project credibility to both intensive and less intensive farmers.”  
Reason for success #8: Targeting 
Two factors have to be kept in mind when setting targets in RO/RB measures. First, the objective 
must be clearly aimed at improving or maintaining a public good. Second, the target must be 
achievable for the farmer. In the RBAPS case study (IRL2) it was stated that “It was extremely 
important that the results indicators were both linked to the biodiversity target and feasible for the 
farmer to deliver”. In the RNP (AT3) targeting is ensured through the cooperation between the 
farmer and the ecologist, who commonly define clear protection objectives for the individual 
fields which are understandable for farmers, advisors, and the control authority. The payment is 
targeted only at such environmental objectives which involve a clear causal link with the farmer’s 
management action, and which are the basis for the control criteria. The control criteria also work 
like an early warning system, giving the farmers a clear signal if the measures work or not. So, 
the farmer knows if he/she is on the right path regarding achieving the environmental objectives 
or whether management adjustments need to be made. In NL3, the key performance indicators 
are selected based on multiple criteria, including their scientifically proven relation with 
biodiversity and that performance can be influenced in the short term by taking measures on the 
farm. 
Reason for success #9: Keep farmers’ participation simple and administrative burden low 
Result-based contract solutions are new and unfamiliar to farmers, therefore they require more 
explanation, and can be quite complex to implement. Nevertheless, an effort should be made to 
keep it as simple as possible for the involved parties. For the BurrenLife programme (IRL1) 
experts stated that: “Although it [the programme] addresses a complex issue, a key success factor 
was the ability to keep farmer participation simple and non-onerous. This is reflected, for 
example, in the simplicity of the farm plans and clarity of the payments (per score and task) and 
is enabled by the high level of available support for the farmer from the local program office and 
the trained farm advisors”. In NL4 it is stated as a strength, that there is a minimal extra 
administrative burden as most data comes from mandatory farm management data tools. FR4 also 




no penalties”, as well as IRL3 “The project is locally based on a simple model that is 
understandable and has achieved strong engagement from the farmers.” On the contrary, in case 
of Bauska nature park (LV3), it was noted that “Practically local landowners are hampered to take 
advantage of this opportunity as they need to prepare a large number of documents before starting 
work”. 
Reason for success #10: Scientifically based and assessed  
In IRL1 and IRL2 the inclusion of science is clearly defined as strength. In NL4 researchers are 
strongly involved in the pilot phase and also in developing and test the key performance 
indicators. Also, in NL3 the biodiversity monitor was devised in close collaboration with 
researchers from Wageningen University & Research and the Louis Bolk Institute. Furthermore, 
in FI6 the active role of research was mentioned as a strength. Eight of the 21 case studies have 
indicated that a scientific partner was involved in the design of the contract solution. 
 
Reason for success and/or failure: Risk management  
The link between payment and result can be perceived by farmers as a risk increasing factor. 
Consequently, risk management in result-based contract solutions is of exceptional importance. 
A lack of risk management can lead to a lower participation rate as well as to non-payment for 
farmers due to the failure to achieve the objectives. This, in turn, leads to dissatisfaction and a 
decline in acceptance. In AT4 it is mentioned as the main risk, that the farmers do not build up 
humus and therefore don’t receive the success fee, even if they might have made investments and 
changes in management. In FR4 one reason for success is the limited risk, because there is no 
penalty in case of non-compliance and the payments are quite low as well and do not represent a 
necessary revenue for farmers. In the scoring approaches, there is the risk that farmers do not 
reach the minimum credit/scoring points: For example, in DE2, a minimum of credit points has 
to be obtained yearly through measure implementation to be able to benefit from the premium 
price for the selected products. In IRL1, the farmers run the risk of not scoring highly enough to 
qualify for payments. AT3 has countered the challenge of risk minimisation with a dual system 
of risk distribution, based on two kinds of result indicators, namely area objectives and control 
criteria. The experts state that this system reduces the risk perception of the partaking farmers as 
“There is a risk that the control criteria will not be met, but the risk is reduced by the non-
sanctioned area objectives”. Risk reduction results from the fact that area objectives, being the 
basis for management decisions, are more complex to reach than the control criteria, focussing 
on controlling the measures taken to reach area objectives. 
Reason for failure #1: High administration and implementation costs, low feasibility of 
large-scale implementation 
In some case studies, high costs for the implementation and administration of result-based 
contracts are reported. As regards the introduction of the RNP in Austria (AT3) for example, the 
experts reported that: “The implementation required a great deal of administrative effort and high 
costs for administration, but this is also due to the fact that it is a pilot project and the costs will 
decrease significantly as the project progresses”. Moreover, in result-based/result-oriented 
solutions often nature conservation advisors are involved and a high level of support is given. On 
the one hand this is a reason for success but on the other hand the high level of support can be 
expensive. Actually, the high costs of some result-based/result-oriented contract solutions might 
be a reason for a limited feasibility of larger scale implementation. In the case of DE2 for example, 
nature protection advice at individual farm level is necessary, moreover there are costs of annual 
nature protection certification. It was stated that these higher costs could limit the case study to a 
certain size, which is opposing the chance of cost reductions if the contract solution was 
implemented on a larger scale. Also in the BurrenProgramme (IRL1), the programme is reported 
to be rather resource intensive to operate. Given this resource intensity, experts consider it 




of the RNP (AT3) it was for example reported that “The definition of the indicators and goals 
costs a lot of time and effort and may not be suitable for a broader approach. However, in the 
further course of the project, it is planned to simplify the indicators and target definition in order 
to ensure a broader approach”.  
Reason for failure #2: Potential bias and deadweight effects - contract solutions reaches 
farmers with already good ecological practices  
Like in many other existing agri-environmental schemes, also result-based and result-oriented 
solutions can’t prevent deadweight effects, meaning that mainly farmers and foresters who 
already perform well in the measures/criteria targeted are attracted by the schemes. Also, result-
based/result-oriented schemes might trigger the problem of adverse selection, meaning that only 
well-informed farmers step into the program. In case of result-based/result-oriented solutions, the 
higher risk of not receiving payment due to not achieving objectives, even if adapting 
management, might even increase the shift of acceptance toward farmers, who already work in 
an environmentally friendly way and are therefore positive to reach the set objectives. In the case 
of the RNP (AT3) as well as DE1 it becomes obvious that mainly farmers with high ecological 
interest, having already participated in former schemes of contractual nature conservation have 
so far been entering the program. Also, in Terre the Sources (FR2), the partaking farmers have 
already developed good ecological practices before, and in the biodiversity monitor for dairy 
(NL3), mainly environmentally well-performing farmers step into the program. Another example 
for potential bias is the nature value bargaining (FI6), where land owners voluntarily provide 
forest areas for value bargaining. Even if these areas need to meet certain characteristics, which 
are inventoried by forest/biology professionals to represent certain important habitat types and 
provide certain structural characteristics, still only the areas provided are bargained and these are 
often not the most valuable ones.  
Reason for failure #3: Lack of funding  
Also for result-based/result-oriented contractual solutions the longevity of the solutions is often 
threatened by the lack of funding. Particularly for solutions being implemented via public sector 
funding. This threat has been mentioned frequently by the involved experts. In this regard it has 
to be mentioned that in RB/RO-cases with EU co-funding the calculation of compensation is 
normally still based on income forgone/ additional costs, thus requiring to calculate with 
“example measure”. The threat of lack of public sector funding for example has been identified 
as a challenge in case of the BurrenLife Programme (IRL1), running for about 20 years with 
constantly changing founding sources and financing parties throughout its lifetime. Also in the 
cases of BRIDE (IRL3) and Bauska Nature Park (LV3), the short-term nature of the funding and 
the question of the securing of future funding has been expressed as a threat. Nevertheless, 
particularly when result-based solutions are implemented by using market mechanisms, such as 
in the case of Humus program (AT4), EcoMethane (FR4), or even the Carbon market Hiilipörssi 
(FI3) solution, where results are directly “bought” by private sector actors, result-based 
approaches can overcome the problem of lack of (public) funding.  
 Conclusions 
• Successful implementation of RB/RO contracts can be linked to a high level of 
knowledge support. This is realized in successful cases through training or advice. Nature 
conservation advisors are particularly often involved in bringing environmental aspects 
closer to farmers and help them to improve the environmental situation on their land. 
Information material, events and the exchange of information among farmers are also 
supportive. 
• RB/RO contracts report higher flexibility. Farmer’s freedom in decision making is often 




“ownership” by the farmers and can result in a higher degree of innovation and 
satisfaction.  
• Due to the ‘Learning by doing’ approach in many RB/RO schemes, farmers better 
understand the connection between their actions and influence on nature. This can help 
to build social capital and can, in the best case, result in a long-term behavioural change.  
• Costs for monitoring results, as well as high administration and implementation costs can 
limit the success of a scheme. In some EU-case studies, high costs for the implementation 
and administration of result-based contracts are reported. Sometimes a nature 
conservation advisor is involved in the case study and a high level of support is given. 
This is a reason for success but can also be quite resource intensive. The analysis of the 
in-depth studies revealed, that most of the result-based initiatives investigated report that 
particularly the costs for setting up the programs and projects have been rather high. As 
regards running costs of result-based schemes, these differ particularly for the different 
ways of monitoring: in result-based schemes with rather technological assessment and 
measurement of fixed performance indicators, such as in EcoMethane (FR4) and the 
Biodiversity monitor (NL3), running costs are comparably “low” or “medium”. In 
contrast to these “technological” solutions, result-based programs with “on-field” 
monitoring of results by ecological advisors and/or controllers are estimated to have 
comparatively high running costs. The high effort for on-field monitoring stems mainly 
from the farm-individuality of the objectives and measures: The most intensive cost 
position is estimated to be investments in project teams as well as in specially trained 
farm advisors. 
• Involving control authorities in the design of indicators in result-based schemes can 
guarantee integrability into RDPs. 
3.2.2 Collective implementation and Cooperation/Collaboration 
 Contract description and specifications 
In contract solutions based on collective implementation and/or cooperation, farmers and/or 
private/public landowners voluntarily enter a joint, collective partnership to commonly deliver 
specific AECPGs. That means that farmers, foresters (and other stakeholders) cooperate (by 
establishing an entity with or without legal personality) to achieve a certain (AECPG) target. 
Contract solutions putting forward collective implementation or cooperative/collaborative 
elements, often address a territorial/landscape level of AECPG provision and therefore mostly 
target a broader bundle of AECPGs. Beyond that, from the CONSOLE case studies it becomes 
evident that such solutions are particularly applied to AECPGs being delivered “across field 
borders”, meaning AECPGs which can hardly be improved by measures on singular fields and 
plots (e.g. water quality). In general, collective and cooperative/collaborative approaches are 
likely to be used to address problems that cannot be solved individually or to achieve certain 
environmental improvements that can better reached by working together.  
Collective contracts can be executed with varying degrees of rigour. Very narrowly defined, 
collective contracts mean that a group of land owners/farmers/foresters join together by 
establishing a formal entity and this entity applies for an AES. The payment for the activities 
carried out to enhance AECPGs is then made to the group and not the individual farmer. In the 
CONSOLE case study sample, a number of cases are found fulfilling this narrow definition. 
However, while screening and collecting case studies it became obvious that many successful 
contractual solutions exist, containing strong elements of collaboration and cooperation without 
fulfilling the element of collective payment. In such cooperative/collaborative contract solutions, 
individuals help each other and work together to achieve a common goal (e.g. the creation of a 
specific habitat), while collective payments are not issued. Also, the solutions are characterised 




In order to not exclude such cases with high potential, in the analysis a distinction is made between 
contractual solutions based on collective implementation per definition and on cases expressing 
strong cooperative/collaborative elements.  
Of the 60 CONSOLE case studies, 13 are assigned to the contract type of collective 
implementation. 5 case studies (FI3; PL1; PL2; NL2 and IRL3) can be classified as combinations 
of collective, value chain, land tenure or result-based contract types. 3 case studies are classified 
to the group of cooperation/collaboration (COOP). In DE4, a cooperative feature is also involved 
but the case is mainly assigned to result-oriented contracts. FI5 represents a special case where 
direct property rights are dissolved and transferred to shares of jointly owned forests under 
common management.   
 
Ctry  ID Contract  Title In-
depth 
BE BE1 CO Participation of private landowners to the ecological restoration of 
the Pond area Midden-Limburg through a close participation of 
private and public landowners and a triple E- approach in the 
3watEr project. 
yes 
BE BE4 CO-RO Flemish nature management plan  
FR FR5 CO-RB HAMSTER – Collective AECM to restore habitats of the 
European Hamster in Alsace (France) 
 
IT IT1 CO Incentives for collective reservoirs  yes 
IT IT2 CO Cooperation in NATURA 2000 benefiting biodiversity (Measure 
16.5)  
 
IT IT6 CO Integrated territorial projects – (ITPs) territorial agreements yes 
LV LV1 CO NUTRINFLOW  
NL NL1 CO Kromme Rijn Collective management  
UK UK1 CO Delivering multiple environmental benefits in the South Pennines  yes 
UK UK2 CO Using natural flood management to achieve multiple 
environmental benefits in Wharfedale  
 
UK UK3 CO Building natural flood management knowledge and capacity in 
Wensleydale  
yes 
UK UK4 CO Natural Flood Management in the River Swale catchment in 
Yorkshire  
 
UK UK5 CO Environmental improvement across a whole catchment: Esk Valley   
PL PL1 CO-LT Natural grazing in Podkarpackie Region Yes 
PL PL2 CO-LT Program “Sheep Plus” - Provincial Program of Economic 
Activation and Preservation of the Cultural Heritage of the Beskids 
and Kraków-Częstochowa Upland 
 
FI FI3 VC-CO-RO Carbon Market – a marketplace for the restoration of ditched 
peatlands 
Yes 
NL NL2 VC-CO Green Deal Dutch Soy (indicates as unclassifiable)  
IRL IRL3 RB-CO BRIDE - Biodiversity Regeneration in a Dairying Environment  
BE BE2 COOP FLANDERS – Flemish Forest Group  
DE DE6 COOP Forest conversion from coniferous to deciduous stands - an eco-
account case 
 
LV LV4 COOP Forest Management  
DE DE4 COOP-RO Agro-ecological transition pathways in arable farming  
FI5 FI5 LT-VC-
COOP 
Green jointly owned forest TUOHI  
Table 5: Overview table about case studies assigned to the contract type CO/COOP,  information about 
country, ID, contract, title and whether the case study was additionally analysed as an in-depth study. 
(case studies described in grey indicate cases where collective implementation/cooperation/collaboration 





In the following, the case studies based on collective implementation are shortly described: 
➢ BE1: 10 private landowners set up a joint association for initiating and participating in 
the so-called ‘3watEr project’, being a Life+ project. The association ensured the 
collective implementation of measures to reach regional environmental objectives, based 
on voluntary agreements by private parties and an integrated management plan. 
➢ BE4: In the ‘Flemish nature management plan’, different land owners and managers 
develop common and differentiated management goals for their respective territories in 
order to develop sustainable nature and forestry. The plan fosters integrated land 
management, according to the Flemish Integrated Management Criteria (ecology, 
economy, social and heritage dimension aspects). 
➢ FR5: The RDP collective project ‘HAMSTER’ was introduced in 2014 in the territorial 
Agri-Environment-Climatic Plan (PAEC) “Great Hamster of Alsace” to protect the 
European Hamster in Alsace. The association AFSAL (Farmers and Wild Animals in 
Alsace) is coordinating the cropping systems of about 140 farmers to favour the 
development of European hamster populations. 
➢ IT1: In the RDP ‘Collective incentives for water reservoirs’ farmers were incentivised to 
commonly build water reservoirs for irrigation. Support was conditional on the creation 
of a consortium composed of a minimum number of farmers. 
➢ IT2: The RDP ‘measure 16.5’ incentivises the local coordination and collaboration of 
public and private actors in projects aimed at the conservation of biodiversity (Case of 
failure). 
➢ IT6: The RDP ‘Integrated Territorial Project’ allows the collective implementation and 
the concentration of non-productive investments aiming at securing environmental assets 
on some specific areas of the Tuscany Region (vulnerable areas, marginalized, etc.). 
➢ NL1: In the Netherlands, the implementation of RDP agri-environmental and 
conservation measures in farmland is partly arranged collectively, where local collectives 
arrange and execute measures. The Kromme Rijn is a region in the Dutch province of 
Utrecht, where such a collective is active, executing agri-environmental management.   
➢ LV1: The Interreg project ‘NUTRINFLOW’ aimed at establishing good practical water 
management examples for the retention of nitrogen and phosphorus, representing win-
win situations for agricultural producers. Through working with farmers and landowners, 
the project promoted and demonstrated the benefits gained from holistic planning and 
coordinated implementation of water retention and on-farm drainage management 
measures. 
➢ UK1 – UK5: The case studies UK1 to UK5 are implementations of the public-sector 
“Countryside Stewardship Facilitation Fund (CSFF)”, providing funding to facilitators 
who interlink land managers (farmers, foresters, other land managers) to facilitate 
knowledge exchange, to better activate AES, and to improve the local natural 
environment at a landscape scale. 
➢ The South Pennines CSFF network is a large network of farmers from the wider 
Yorkshire area benefiting from the support and active involvement of local 
government agencies aiming to provide information on how to better manage the local 
ecosystems especially under the threat of extreme weather events such as the 
damaging floods of 2015. 
➢ UK2: The Wharfedale CSFF network was set up to provide multiple environmental 
benefits through increased biodiversity, protection of historic landscapes, wetland 
management and improvements in water quality. The network was brought together 
by, and it is now coordinated through the Yorkshire Dales Rivers Trust which allows 
greater connectivity with, and knowledge of, similar activity taking place across the 
region. 
➢ UK3: The Wensleydale CSFF group was set up to improve knowledge sharing and 
provide training in farm practices aimed at improving natural flood management 
(NFM). The group is also focused on how NFM can be delivered in conjunction with 




➢ UK4: Farmers and land managers in eastern Yorkshire make up the small Swaledale 
(CSFF) network to share knowledge on how to provide Natural Flood Management 
(NFM) and maintain soil health. 
➢ UK5: Farmers across the Esk river catchment are working together to implement 
solutions to improve the water quality in the Esk Valley. The river contains salmon 
and trout and efforts are underway to boost the freshwater pearl mussels and migratory 
fish through tackling problems with sediment and pollutants.  
➢ PL1: The program ‘Natural Grazing in Podkarpackie’ aims to preserve, protect, and 
restore biodiversity in valuable natural areas. The program is based on a yearly open call, 
in which non-profit organisations (and other eligible parties) can apply to arrange grazing 
on specific areas of land by subcontracted farmers, providing animals (cattle, horses, 
sheep, goats, deer) and grazing land. Payments are issued collectively to the approved 
NGOs, which transfer funds to the sub-contracted farmers (or producer groups).  
➢ PL2: Likewise, in the program ‘Sheep plus’ annual open calls are organised in which 
non-profit organizations (e.g. foundations, associations, NGO cooperatives) and other 
eligible parties present offers to arrange grazing on specific areas of land by subcontracted 
farmers, who provide animals (sheep and goats) and grazing land. 
 
The majority of the CONSOLE case studies representing collective implementation all public-
sector funded, mostly by the countries’ governments, supported by EU funding. The collective 
implementation case studies include 6 programs being directly integrated into the national RDP 
(IT1, IT2, IT6, NL1, FR5, UK1-5). Here, the Dutch collective management of Kromme Rjin 
(NL1) is a classic example for public-sector funded collective implementation per definition. The 
program is integrated into the national RDP, payments are collectively issued and distributed 
within the collective. In FR5, the collective AECM HAMSTER was introduced in 2014 in the 
territorial Agri- Environment-Climatic Plan (PAEC). The incentives for collective reservoirs 
(IT1) have been programmed in the RDP since the period 2007 – 2013 and the ITP (IT6) is 
developed within a multi-measure call of the Tuscan RDP 2014-2020. The 5 CSFF case studies 
(UK1 – UK5) represent public-sector funded contract solutions being part of the English RDP, 
with a strong focus on network building, aimed at knowledge-sharing and at pursuing specific 
environmental objectives together. Moreover, the sample of collective case studies includes 2 
classic examples of public-sector funded collective implementation not being integrated into the 
national RDP (PL1 and PL2). Also here, collective payments are issued to the NGOs, which then 
distribute the funding to the farmers. 2 cases within the sample represent collective 
implementation in line with LIFE+ and Interreg projects (BE1 and LV1).  
Short description of contract solutions based on cooperation/collaboration:  
➢ BE2: A ‘Forest Group’ is a voluntary partnership between both public and private forest 
owners. Through this cooperation, an attempt is made to provide answers to problems 
caused by the fragmentation of the forest. Forest Groups offer a comprehensive service 
that helps the many forest owners manage their forest parcels. 
➢ DE6: The environmental restoration of a private forest in Krailling, Bavaria is undertaken 
as an eco-account offsetting scheme under the German Impact Mitigation Regulation. 
100ha of forest are ecologically upgraded while maintaining the subsurface industrial use. 
Nature enhancement of forest aisles complements this measure.  
➢ LV4: Contractual agreements (cooperation) are concluded with forest owners on a 
voluntary basis for the organisation of seminars and practical training for other forest 
owners, students, etc. Topics of sustainable and environmentally friendly forest 
management are dealt with. 
 
All 3 CONSOLE case studies representing contract solutions based on cooperation/collaboration 
address forest ecosystems. Also here, contractual solutions are mainly based on public funding. 




government provides the funding of this private association, while forest managers and owners 
contract the goals of the Forest Group through their membership. In DE6, the private eco-account 
scheme represents a contractual agreement of a private forest owner with the nature protection- 
and forest authorities for recognition of the private eco-account. In the LV4 forest management, 
cooperation is based on a cooperation agreement between the 3 partaking demonstration farms 
and the Pasaules dabas fonds. 
Implementation mechanisms:  
As indicated before, a criterion of collective contracts is the establishment of an entity with or 
without legal personality. Some of the collective and cooperative/collaborative solutions case 
studies, provided information about the form in which the collective grouping of farmers and 
foresters is implemented. In the cases of FR5, NL1, BE1, and UK1-5, the prerequisite for 
collective implementation is the establishment of a legal entity in which partaking members have 
to join. In Hamster (FR5), the farmers willing to participate in the collective have to join the 
AFSAL association, in the 3WatEr LIFE+ project the 10 partaking private landowners joined the 
association OVML vzw (ntwikkeling Vijvergebied Midden-Limburg vzw) by as prerequisite for 
implementing the LIFE+ project. In the Dutch Kromme Rjin Collective (NL1), farmers, estate 
owners and other private landowners are part of the collective Utrecht East and in UK1 – UK5, 
farmers join into the CSFF group, together with the facilitator, and the funding body. In contrast, 
in the Polish cases of Natural grazing in Podkarpacki (PL1) and in Sheep plus (PL2), 
implementation is not based on associations or other legal entities, rather are farmers 
subcontracted by the non-profit organisations/party eligible for funding, which is in charge of the 
program implementation. In the BE2 contract solutions, cooperation is ensured by the forest 
owners and managers entering the private Flemish Forest Group association. 
Another prerequisite for some of the collective contract solutions represented by the CONSOLE 
case studies is the number of participants entering the contract. In some cases, minimum and 
maximum numbers of participation are required for the contract to come to life. In the UK CSFFs 
for example, a minimum of 4 farmers is needed to establish a CSFF while the upper limit of 
participation are 100 farmers. In the ITP (IT1), minimum participation is defined by 15, maximum 
participation by 100 participants. The Dutch collective management of Kromme Rjin (NL) shows 
the broadest flexibility in numbers of participant, requiring a minimum of 2 farmers and a 
maximum of 300 farmers joining the collective. 
Farm/forestry types/systems 
Table 6 gives an overview of the farm/forestry types/systems addressed by the collective contract 
solutions. The table reveals that in collective contract solutions particularly often the forestry is 
addressed. Further, 5 collective contract solutions are designed for farms that are located within 
river catchments. The remaining collective contractual solutions are distributed among various 





ID Contract  Title Farm types addressed 
BE1 CO 3watEr project Mixed / forestry 
BE4  CO - RO Flemish nature management plan  Forestry 
FR5 CO HAMSTER  Arable farming / mixed 
IT1 CO Incentives for collective reservoirs Permanent / Fruit production 
IT6 CO Integrated territorial projects  Permanent / wine 
LV1 CO NUTRINFLOW River catchment 
NL1 CO Kromme Rijn  Mixed 
UK1 CO South Pennines  Mixed 
UK2 CO Wharfedale  River catchment 
UK3 CO Wensleydale  River catchment 
UK4 CO Yorkshire  River catchment 
UK5 CO Esk Valley  River catchment 
PL1 LT – CO Natural grazing in Podkarpackie 
Region 
Grassland 
PL2 LT – CO Program “Sheep Plus”  Grassland 
FI3 VC–CO–
RO 
Carbon Market  Forestry / peatland 
NL2 VC-CO Green Deal Dutch Soy  Arable farming 
BE2 COOP FLANDERS – Flemish Forest 
Group 
Forestry 
DE6 COOP Forest conversion from coniferous 
to deciduous stands 
Forestry / semi natural habitats 
LV4 COOP Forest Management Forestry 
DE4 COOP-RO Agro-ecological transition 
pathways in arable farming 
Arable farming 
Table 6: Farm/forestry types/systems addressed by the contract solutions 
 
Reasons for the implementation of contract solutions based on collective implementation 
and cooperation/collaboration 
The CONSOLE case studies, reveal that collective implementation approaches are often 
implemented to address a landscape level, to improve broader bundles of AECPGs, or to improve 
specific AECPGs which can be provided only by implementing measures on larger spatial units.  
A classic AECPG to be addressed on a larger scale than field size is biodiversity of fauna, 
normally depending on the existence of specific habitats that go beyond the borders of fields: The 
LIFE+ 3WatEr project (BE1) for example aims to conserve and restore habitats (e.g. oligotrophic 
waters) for specific fauna species (tree frog, bittern, etc.). Also the HAMSTER contract solution 
(FR5) targets at the restoration of very specific habitats suited for the European hamster, limited 
to a specific geographical area but covering the area of over 140 farms.  
Another AECPG classically best to be improved collectively by measures going beyond the scale 
of single fields or plots are water quantity and water quality (IT1, IT6, LV1). In LV1 for example, 
the Interreg project was implemented responding to the common pan-Baltic challenge to 
implement more effective and acceptable measures to reduce nutrient inflows to the surface 
waters and the Baltic Sea from agriculture. In the initiative of incentivising collective reservoirs 
(IT1), the collection of irrigation water is only feasible to be implemented on a level beyond single 
plots. Also in the collective management of Kromme Rjin (NL1) the improvement of water 
quality is addressed, as well as the enhancement of landscape diversity that supports recreation 
and the provision of habitats for species including bats and owls.  
The program “Natural grazing in Podkarpackie” (PL1) targets a landscape level and has a special 
focus on the maintenance of cultural landscape and the AECPGs provided within. It responds to 
the need for economic and tourist activation of the Podkarpackie Voivodeship, as well as the need 
to protect naturally valuable meadow and pasture areas shaping the unique landscape while 
maintaining biodiversity. Also, in PL2 the aim is to preserve, protect and restore biodiversity and 




Last but not least, the CSFFs represented by the UK cases are good examples of how broader 
bundles of AECPGs can be addressed by networks of land managers, involving their regional 
knowledge about which measures are effective and necessary. The CSFFs are specifically targeted 
to local criticalities, and include multiple environmental activities designed to address landscape 
level AECPG provision, such as flood risk management, habitat creation, moorland restoration, 
and water quality. Moreover, the CSFFs are exemplary for the potential of bundling knowledge 
and “power” to activate subsidies targeted to regional environmental needs.  
Also, the 3 CONSOLE contract solutions being based on cooperation and collaboration address 
environmental problems in forest ecosystems at a territorial level. The case of the Flemish Forest 
Group (BE2) reveals, that cooperation can be beneficial in case of challenges stemming from 
fragmented forest ownership: the program allows forest owners to incorporate the management 
of their forests into a larger project and receive assistance in forest management via coaching and 
technical support. Moreover, the forest group enables the organisation of joint wood sales and 
management plans. In DE6, the main goal is to increase the percentage of deciduous trees through 
reforestation, forest restructuring and a targeted promotion of native trees in view of enhanced 
species and habitat protection. The case is an example of how collaboration between a private 
forest owner and the nature protection authority enables the long-term protection and ecological 
enhancement of a large forest area.  
Improved environmental effectiveness:  
Compared to contractual solutions targeted on the improvement of AECPGs on farm- or field-
level, the landscape-oriented approach of contractual solutions based on collective 
implementation can offer environmental advantages, such as the reduction of habitat 
fragmentation, the preservation and restoration of ecological networks, having positive effects on 
biodiversity and ecological effectiveness. In the CONSOLE case studies representing collective 
solutions, increased environmental effectiveness has often been reported by the experts. It 
becomes obvious, that collective contracts are particularly introduced when individual contracts 
have failed in enhancing the provision of specific AECPGs demanding a large scale 
implementation of measures.  
The Interreg project NUTRINFLOW (LV1) is a successful example where water quality has been 
collectively improved. The experts state that “The project responded to the common pan-Baltic 
challenge to implement more effective and acceptable measures to reduce nutrient inflows to the 
surface waters and the Baltic Sea from agriculture. It is evident from recent history of 
implementing on-farm agri-environment measures, that they have not yielded the results needed 
in terms of reduced nutrient losses and that complementary measures in the drainage network and 
landscape are needed. The investments demonstrate a holistic, cooperative approach and lead to 
reduced nutrient losses from agricultural land to the watershed.“ In the HAMSTER project (FR5), 
the experts reported that “Operations aiming at maintaining European Hamster populations were 
carried out since the late 1990s but failed to meet the objectives. Following a complaint submitted 
in 2006, the Court of Justice of the European Union convicted France in 2011 for its lack of 
effective protection. Two individual agri-environmental measures supporting the implementation 
of crops and agricultural practices in favour of the European hamster were introduced during the 
2007-2013 CAP programming period. However, the lack of spatial coordination of the operations 
limited their impact. Therefore, the National Hunting and Wildlife Bureau (today part of the 
French Agency for Biodiversity) and the Chamber of Agriculture of Alsace took the initiative of 
proposing a collective agri-environment-climate measure (AECM) in the territorial project of the 
2014-2020 CAP programming period, in addition to 4 individual AECM. In order to encourage 
more farmers to get involved in this approach, an individual bonus designed as a “burrow 
premium” was introduced in 2018 to reward the land managers of the plots on which at least one 




as the number of European hamster individuals kept increasing since 2014 and farmers maintain 
their participation.“ Also the collective implementation of RDP in the Netherlands was driven by 
failures in environmental effectiveness of individual AES. For the case of collective management 
in Kromme Rjin (NL1) it was reported that “Collective implementation of agri-environmental 
management has been started up throughout the Netherlands since 2016. After individual 
management had proven to fail to deliver the desired agri-environmental-climate public goods 
(AECPGs), a larger-scale implementation of agri-environmental management was considered a 
more feasible and promising solution“. 
Controls and monitoring of compliance in collective contract solutions- some examples 
 
In the sample of CONSOLE CO/COOP contracts, the controls are quite complex and diverse. A 
distinction can be made, between contract solutions implemented in the RDP and contract 
solutions introduced by the local government or conducted through a project. Following are some 
examples of control and monitoring of compliance from the CONSOLE case studies which are 
implemented in the RDP.  
➢ In NL1, provinces and national government are in charge of monitoring the ecological 
effects of agri-environmental management. This is delegated to NGOs that do regular 
species monitoring and provide data to the National Flora and Fauna Database. 
Monitoring is performed by trained volunteers. Indicators used are trends of target species 
in comparison between areas with and without agri-environmental management. 
Collectives themselves monitor if the agri-environmental management that has been 
agreed on is implemented. A special committee is in charge of this monitoring. Indicators 
used are binary; assessing if the measures are implemented or not. The Dutch Food Safety 
Authority (Nederlandse Voedsel-  en  Warenauthoriteit, NVWA) inspects at least 5% of 
the agri-environmental management in the field. 
➢ In the HAMSTER example (FR5), the Departmental Directorates of Territories (DDT) 
monitors the surfaces under hamster-friendly crops using the farmers yearly statements 
necessary to receive CAP aids, and communicates those elements to the Chamber of 
Agriculture of Alsace and the AFSAL. In addition, there are periodic field inspections 
(random checks) in accordance with the usual monitoring operations of the CAP. Farmers 
are monitored individually based on their annual management plan that is transferred to 
the DDT. The administration can then check the repartition of the actions within a group 
of farmers.  
In cases where (nature) management plans are involved, monitoring and control is often also 
specified in these plans (BE4, BE1). In the collective UK cases, results are not monitored yet, but 
monitoring and evaluation is conducted through the claim expenses of the CSFF facilitators. 
Natural England determines whether farmers and CSFFs’ case is offering good value for money. 
In PL1, a case study initiated by the local government, the controls on the implementation of the 
program are carried out by the voivodship office representatives, who assess the status of task 
implementation, effectiveness, reliability and quality of implementation, correctness of spending 
public funds and properness of record keeping. 
 
Linking collective agreements and cooperations with (regional) nature management plans  
Collective contracts and cooperation can be well combined with (regional) nature management 
plans, as they provide a precise list of the measures to be taken and the resulting environmental 
benefits. In BE2, nature management plans are described as follows: “The nature management 
plan describes the most important values of an area for its ecological, social and economic 
function and makes well-founded choices about the important objectives for this area. The plan 
must also clarify which measures are required for this, and how and where they are implemented. 
One also wants to know whether the area under management is actually evolving in the right 
direction and, where necessary, adjusting management is needed.” In BE2 there are four 
categories of nature management plans, with different implications as far as commitments, 




for the LIFE+ project, an integrated nature management plan for the implementation of the nature 
conservation management objectives is being established. In the case of Kromme Rijn, the 
province of Utrecht defines targets in its annual nature management plan (NL1). Members of the 
Forest Group in BE2 are stimulated to participate in joint management plans. 
 Reasons for success and failure  
Through the joint analysis of collective agreements and cooperations, 7 reasons for success, 2 
reasons for success and failure and 2 reasons for failure were identified.10  
Reason for success #1: Clearly defined roles and measures  
The requirements to be met by farmers, as well as the management measures they should or should 
not take, are often clearly defined and negotiated in collective agreements. This clear structuring 
of roles can contribute significantly to the success of the contract solution. In the 3WatEr project 
(BE1) every private landowner within the association signs an agreement in which he/she agrees 
that certain actions may be carried out on his/her territory and that he/she also makes the necessary 
preparations to ensure that these actions can be carried out well. In other case studies, there is a 
catalogue of measures to which farmers can refer (NL1). FR5 defines collective objectives and 
requirements, such as: “At least 26% of the total utilised agricultural area (UAA) of the collective 
zone declared must be dedicated to crops favourable to the European Hamster (winter cereals, 
alfalfa)”. In the IT6 Territorial Agreement, the participants undertake to make all necessary 
arrangements to ensure correct implementation and to carry out the relevant interventions within 
the timeframe set by the project, so a time component is also introduced. BE2 further explains 
why contractual obligations are advantageous: “Contractual commitments for management plans 
and projects are […] [designed in a way] forest managers and owners can trust; this is important 
for a long-term implementation of objectives (integrated approach: ecology, economy, 
education)”. Futhermore, the Nutrinflow case highlighted the importance of agreeing with all 
concerned land managers before implementing collective measures.  
Reason for success #2: Coordination agent/Intermediary 
In collective contract solution, often 3 groups of participants are involved. Besides the land 
managers (farmer/forester) and the funding body, there is a managing authority, a coordination 
agent or an intermediary to coordinate the land managers involvement as well as the actions to be 
taken. This is a key element of many collective contractual solutions. In the collective contract 
solutions represented by the CONSOLE case studies, the coordination agent has different names: 
in the UK case studies it is called “facilitator“, in the Netherlands “the collective“, in IT1 
”consortium“, in IT6 ”leading subject“ and in FR5 ”intermediary“. The coordination agent has to 
fulfil different tasks, for example, to attract more farmers (FR5, UK1-5), organise meetings, 
manage the communication (UK, FR5), guarantee compliance (IT6), coordinate and specify 
operations (FR5, IT6, NL1, LV1) and regulate the payments (PL1, PL2, NL1). In IT6 it is 
expressed that the collective contract requires a leading subject to coordinate the management of 
the proposal. In IT1 it is mentioned as a weakness that without a managing authority the 
partnership is precarious.  
Reason for success 3: Farmers or local farm advisors as an initiator  
Since collective agreements demand a high level of common understanding and ‘vision’, and the 
basic will to work together rather than as an individual, the initiative of the grouping can be a 
factor influencing success. Here, the BE1 case study stands out in particular. In BE1, in a bottom-
up initiative, landowners have joint forces to participate in a LIFE+ project. Until then, nature 
management projects have been a monopoly of NGOs in Flanders. In the case study the process 
of initiating the collective implementation was described as follows: „As in the Midden-Limburg 
                                                     
10 Something is considered a reason for success if there is an indication of a benefitting influence in the contract 




area, private land ownership was crucial to realizing specific nature management objectives, 10 
local landowners took the initiative to start a Life+ project with other stakeholders. For doing so 
they created a private association (OVML vzw) assuming a common partnership in the Life+ 
project as an associated beneficiary of the project. Private contracts were signed between OVML 
vzw and each of the 10 landowners for the further implementation of the LIFE+ project, also 
through an integrated nature management plan.” An advantage of such bottom-up approach is that 
the needs of the farmers are particularly taken into account right from the start, which can result 
in a high level of commitment and trust. The BE1 example has received a NATURA 2000 award 
for its good involvement of the partners. Another example is the CSFF of UK1. Here the network 
was initially set up by a farm advisor who had good contacts with farmers, local authorities, and 
other large landowners.  
Reason for success #4: Characteristics of the group/collective and a shared vision 
In several of the case studies, it is described as advantageous if the group joining into a collective 
is rather homogeneous and has similar characteristics, while homogeneity can mean similarity in 
terms of farm size, orientation, farming practices, and attitudes to environmental issues of the 
farm.  Furthermore, it is beneficial if the persons in the group pursue the same goals. For example, 
as one strength of the CSFF in UK1 it is mentioned the “Cohesion of the group as members have 
common goals which are easier to achieve as part of a group”. Also in UK2, as well as in UK4, 
the homogeneous farming practices (sheep) with common interests in natural flood management 
is named as a strength. Weaknesses mentioned (UK2) are the differences between the farm sizes 
of the CSFF members, which result in the network members having different focuses, interest and 
priorities, which makes the facilitation and coordination of the CSFF difficult. A diverse group 
was also identified as a risk in UK3: „This group is big and covers a large geographical area. 
Members of the group can be different in terms of what they want to focus on. It has been a 
challenge focusing on such a diverse group with differing interests and has meant holding 
meetings that capture everyone’s interest can be difficult. Most members are upland farmers 
whose businesses rely on Basic Payment Scheme (BPS) and Agri-Environmental Scheme (AES) 
support. BPS is being phased out and AES is changing causing concerns about payments suddenly 
stopping. Farmer retirement and the subsequent splitting up and incorporation of some farms into 
neighbouring farms creating a large variability between small and large holdings amplifies the 
differences in farming methods and focus which can impact upon participation in AES.” 
Furthermore, for UK3 one weakness of the contract solution is noted to be the large number of 
members with very diverse farm practices and interests with farm holdings located across a large 
geographical area, to build up a relationship took therefore longer. UK5 also highlighted group 
identity as a favourable factor. The group identity leads to securing additional income for 
environmental management, stewardship, and training. Within the group, there should also be an 
awareness of the problem, which should be tackled collectively (e.g. poor water quality). If this 
is not the case in the group, some effort should be made to raise awareness.  
Reason for success #5: Regular Meetings 
Regular meetings are an important element within contract solutions, in which the main focus is 
on group bonding and networking, and where knowledge exchange among the participants is 
crucial. In the UK1 CSFF, meetings are organised monthly while it is reported that attendance 
increases from month to month. More than 30 meetings have taken place covering topics ranging 
from climate emergency to the marketing of rare breed mutton. In the UK1 case study, the 
formation of the network (and the regular meetings?) is perceived as an opportunity for members 
to exchange knowledge and ideas about novel farm products and services and taking them towards 
commercialisation. In UK2, the CSFF network and the meetings are also seen as an opportunity 
to bring people together, allowing easier comparison between owners and tenants, and 
highlighting the different pressures they are under. Also in the UK3 CSFF regular meetings take 




to engage with natural flood management measures and had expressed particular interest in soil 
management, flood water infiltration and planting of trees and hedges; all these are issues that are 
addressed in the monthly meetings to build up knowledge of different practices.“ Also in DE4 
regular exchanges are key to initiate a bottom-up process in view of agroecological 
transformation.  
Reason for success #6: Stakeholder involvement  
In FR5 it is mentioned as a strength that a network of stakeholders favours sustainable cooperation 
and innovative solutions (European experts, National Action Plan, programme LIFE Alister). In 
UK3, the “partnership involving the farmer members plus Yorkshire Dales National Park 
Authority (YDNPA), Yorkshire Dales Rivers Trust (YDRT) and Dales Farmer Network (DFN), 
all sit[ting in] the steering  group” is reported as a strength of the network.  
Reason for success #7: Reduced (transaction) costs  
For the case of FR5 it was expressed that this type of AECM (collective) is beneficial because it 
diminishes the transaction costs of the public authorities (instead of interacting with 140 farmers, 
the institution only deals with one intermediary). In NL1 it is mentioned as an advantage for the 
Province, that there is an easier subsidy allocation because of dealing with fewer partners. Some 
of the burden and costs are also transferred from the farmers to the coordination agent (FR5). In 
BE2 there is a cost reduction, due to the reduced fees for collective sale of timber. Collective 
measures can lead to a cost reduction for public authorities, while for land managers involvement 
in collective contract solutions requires time, in particular during their setting up, thus competing 
with labour time. In some cases, however, costs for coordination have been mentioned, but 
assessments of these costs are still missing (IT6).  
Reason for success and failure #1: Risk  
The risk in collective contracts is shared with the group (FR5), which can be an advantage for 
farmers. However, there may also be an increased risk, for example, if the payment is linked to 
the achievement of collective objectives (BE1). This discrepancy is well described in the IT6 case 
study, where the dependency on individual parties and the associated higher risk are discussed: 
“Since the core of the territorial agreement is the final realization of the ITP, which depends on 
at least 2/3 of the investments made by participants, the main risk is the failure of the entire project 
due to the fault of one or some participants. In this case, the project must be re-evaluated by the 
Region. So the main benefit, as well as the main risks, are related to the strong interdependence 
between participants”. 
Reason for success and failure #2:  Complexity 
The complexity in collective agreements can be viewed from two sides. On the one hand, there 
may be a reduced complexity for the individual farmer. The administrative burden is reduced and 
the coordination agent takes over some of the administrative work. For the Dutch collectives 
(NL1), it was stated that “the collective implementation takes away administrative burden” and 
for the case of BE2, it was reported that the collective implementation can help “reducing the 
elements that remove motivation: administration”. On the other hand, the complexity of the 
contract solution itself is sometimes high. For IT2, which is classified as a failure, it is reported 
that the planning itself was too complex and this is one reason for failure. Also IT6 cites as a 
weakness of the collective contract the extreme complexity of the contract and the long and 
complicated management. The Dutch example also mentions that the bureaucracy has not yet 
been solved (NL1) and in DE6 the complex planning and related costs are mentioned also as a 
weakness.  
Reason for failure #1: Dependence on public funds  
Almost all collective contract solutions depend on government financial resources, and except for 




strengths and weaknesses of the contract solutions, this dependence on public funding is often 
seen as a threat (BE4; FR5; NL1; UK2; UK3; UK4).  
Reason for failure #2: Competition:  
It may be that farmers see themselves as competitors in the contract solution and that therefore a 
joint contract solution and cooperation is hampered. In the successful case studies in CONSOLE 
this was not the case anywhere, it was only mentioned in the case study UK1 that: “There is a 
possibility that fellow farmers are viewed as competitors and not as collaborators”.  
 Conclusions 
• Contract solutions putting forward collective implementation or cooperative elements, 
often address a territorial/landscape level of AECPG provision and therefore mostly 
target a broader bundle of AECPGs. Beyond that, it becomes evident that such solutions 
are particularly applied to AECPGs being delivered “across field borders”, meaning 
AECPGs which can hardly be improved by measures on singular fields and plots. 
• Both in the EU case studies (and in the case studies from outside the EU), the involvement 
of an intermediary was clearly defined as a success factor. In many cases beyond the 
CONSOLE EU case studies the existence or ad-hoc creation of an intermediary was a 
necessary condition for ensuring the implementation of more articulated and effective 
contracts. In EU-collective agreements, a person or organisation acting as an intermediary 
and coordinator with the task of organising meetings and managing communication, 
ensuring compliance, and coordinating and specifying operations was stated also as 
crucial. 
• The requirements to be met by farmers and the measures they should or should not take 
are often clearly defined and negotiated in successful collective agreements. Therefore, a 
clear structuring of roles can contribute significantly to the success of collective contract 
solutions.   
• Fostering bottom-up approaches and involving regional key actors as coordinating units 
enhances commitment and motivation in collective approaches. 
• In several of the EU case studies, it is described as advantageous if the group has similar 
characteristics and is therefore homogeneous in terms of size, orientation, farming 
practices, and attitudes to environmental issues of the farm. Furthermore, it is beneficial 
if the persons in the group pursue the same goals and develop a group identity. Therefore, 
the group should be small, manageable, and homogenous, with a common problem 
awareness and a shared vision. 
• Joint meetings and working together for the delivery of AECPGs can lead to the 
development of social capital within the groups, resulting in increased social interaction 
and a “feeling of belonging”. Furthermore, it can lead to an increased willingness for 
advice and mutual support. 
• High dependence on public funding can be seen as a threat to collective contracts because 
of the need to respect detailed rules for payment calculation, controls, etc.  
 
3.2.3 Value chain-based contract solutions 
 Contract description and specifications 
A number of CONSOLE case studies consider the production of AECPGs in connection with the 
production of private goods. The contractual solutions for improved AECPG production 
represented by the CONSOLE case studies are in parts directly pushed forward by the value chain 
members, having an interest in the documentation of environmental benefits of supplying farms 




through finance and appropriate contracts. Here, mostly certain environmental requirements have 
to be met by the producers in the production of the private good (e.g. reduced use of nitrogen, 
higher animal welfare standards, preservation of biodiversity, etc.). Value chain related contracts 
might lead to sales guarantees for the producers, price premiums and/or the use and marketing of 
products under specific brands. Moreover, some value-chain related contractual solution case 
studies are examples of a way of better supporting and marketing organic production and to 
activate the carbon market.  
In sum, 13 of the 60 case studies are assigned to value chain related contract solutions. DE2 and 
FR2 are allocated to RB, while also including VC contractual features.  
Ctry  ID Contract  Title In-
depth 
AT AT1 VC ALMO - Alpine oxen meat from Austria  
BG BG2 VC Organic honey from Stara Planina mountain sites  
BG BG3 VC “The Wild Farm" organic farmers  yes 
DE DE5 VC Water protection bread yes 
ES ES1 VC Cooperative rice production in coastal wetlands in  Southern 
Spain   
 
ES ES2 VC Organic wine in Rueda, Spain (Rueda) yes 
ES ES4 VC Integrated production in the olive groves 
 
yes 
FI FI3 VC-CO- RO Carbon Market – a marketplace for the restoration of ditched 
peatlands 
yes 
FR FR3 VC Esprit Parc National - Food and services in the national park of 
Guadeloupe  
 
IT IT4 VC “Carta del Mulino” – Barilla yes 
NL NL2 VC- CO Green Deal Dutch Soy   
PL PL3 VC Program “Flowering meadows” - contracts for protection of 
biodiversity and water resources by regular mowing of 
meadows 
 
PL PL4 VC Bio-Babalscy - organic pasta chain preserving old varieties of 
cereals 
Yes 
DE DE2 RB-VC Organic farming for biodiversity  
FR FR2 RB-VC Terres de Sources - Public food order in Brittany, France  
Table 7: Overview table about case studies assigned to the contract type value chain, information about 
country, ID, contract, title and whether the case study was additionally analysed as an in-depth study. 
(case studies described in grey indicate cases where value chain integration is solely an element among 
other (more dominant) contract features) 
 
In the following, the case studies based on value-chain contract solutions are shortly described: 
➢ AT1: In the ALMO project a meat production plant, a foundation for animal welfare and 
400 farmers managing regional alpine pastures work together to produce and market 
alpine oxen with higher animal welfare standards. 
➢ BG2: Farmers producing organic honey in a natural reserve joined forces in an 
organization of producers in 2013. The organization has a contract with one of the biggest 
producers, distributors, and retailers of organic food in the country. In the contract, the 
retailer buys the processed honey from the organization paying a premium price and 
distributes it as a trademark for organic honey with biodiversity features under a famous 




➢ BG3: The Wild farm is a collective initiative of 4 organic farmers implementing specific 
animal welfare standards and agri-environmental measures during beef production. Wild 
farm covers the whole value chain from animal husbandry to meat processing and 
marketing of the products in a small store in Sofia. Moreover, a contract exists with a 
distributor for organic/natural/eco-friendly foods. 
➢ DE5: In the water protection bread initiative, actors along the value chain, from wheat-
producing farmers, to mills, bakeries and the consumers are engaging to protect ground- 
and drinking water. Farmers renounce late fertilization of their wheat fields for avoiding 
nitrate inputs into the groundwater while bakeries commit to process this wheat.  
➢ ES1: ‘Cooperative rice production in coastal wetlands’ represents a value-chain related 
contract solution, where rice with higher standards is produced (integrated production of 
selected varieties). In the case study, rice producers are associated and work together to 
produce rice in partial and full organic production of high standards. 
➢ ES2: The initiative ‘Organic wine in Rueda’ targets to expand organic wine production 
in an emblematic area. The winery Riscal guarantees the purchase of organic grapes, and 
markets the wine under specific labels, advertised to the domestic and export markets. 
➢ ES4: The 'integrated production' program provides the farmer with a sustainable brand 
that is usually linked to a better market price. The contract can be made directly with the 
administration or through cooperatives that manage various farms. As an added value, 
the use of earth observation techniques allows the monitoring of Soil Organic Carbon 
(SOC) under different crop management, increasing the soil quality and the mitigation of 
climate change impacts.” 
➢ FI3: ‘Carbon Market’ (Hiilipörssi) is an online donation service designed to reduce 
carbon emissions and increase carbon storage by restoring ditched peatlands. It is targeted 
to consumers and companies who want to decrease their carbon footprint. Landowners 
offer the ditched peatland to be restored to its natural state as carbon stock. Investments, 
actually donations, from private persons and enterprises provide capital that enables 
restoration actions. The landowner commits to leave the peatland untouched and 
transform it into private protection before the restoration begins. 
➢ FR3: “Esprit de Parc” is a brand promoted, delivered, and granted by the French 
Biodiversity Agency. The label is granted to farmers and tourism enterprises adopting 
production practices for nature protection (close to organic farming) in the vicinity of the 
core natural reserves in National Parks. In Guadeloupe, this might be an opportunity for 
agroforestry farmers to get better prices. 
➢ PL3: The program ‘Flowering meadows’ has been introduced in 2011 by the Żywiec 
Zdrój S.A. company (one of the largest in Poland producers of bottled water and other 
soft drinks) within their Corporate Social Responsibility policy. Under the program, 
farmers/landowners in the communes of Jeleśnia, Węgierska Górka, Radziechowy-
Wieprz regularly mow meadows respecting certain rules to protect biodiversity and water 
resources used by the company.  
➢ PL4: The Bio-Babalscy Organic Pasta company is a family business, which together with 
about 90 supplying farmers preserve rare varieties of wheat, cultivated to produce seeds 
and grains for processing to various cereal products. Farmers delivering to BioBabalsky 
are guaranteed fair prices as well as knowledge transfer and management 
recommendations. 
➢ IT4: ‘Carta del Mulino’ is an initiative proposed by Barilla to enhance the sustainable 
future path of its production. The Carta del Mulino program has particular focus on the 
improvement of farmland biodiversity, but also water quality, by the implementation of 
10 rules of production defined in the ISCC Plus program which have to be met by 
partaking farmers.  
➢ NL2: The Green Deal Dutch Soy represents a contract solution between national 
government, regional governments, a soy processer/feed producer, and farmers. The 
common aim was to establish a viable production chain for soy in the Netherlands, by 
identifying the most suitable varieties and ensuring a solid soy production volume that 




In terms of implementation mechanisms, AT1, BG2, BG3, ES1, ES2, ES4, and IT4 follow a 
similar format, namely the production of a private good in compliance with certain environmental 
requirements. In PL3 no direct product is involved, the company puts the case study into practice 
because of the image and also because water springs of the company are located in the case study 
region. PL3 is led by a water bottle company benefitting from good water quality. FI3 represents 
a different approach, directly addressing the carbon market. Here the product is GHG emission 
reduction, while payments are devoted to peatland restauration measures which – in the future – 
will lead to carbon sequestration. Looking at the acceptance of the contract solution, DE5 and 
PL4 are particularly interesting cases: The contractual solutions appear to be particularly highly 
accepted on the farmers’ side as for the sustainably produced raw material (in both cases wheat) 
fair prices are guaranteed.  
Farm/forestry types/systems:  
Table 8 gives an overview of the farm/forestry types/systems addressed by the value chain 
contract solutions. It reveals that value chain contract solutions particularly involve farming types 
specialised on the production of a specific, marketable product (e.g. rice, olives, honey, meat, 
etc.). Only in four contract solutions no specific production or farming types are addressed.  
ID Contract  Title Farm types addressed 
AT1 VC ALMO  Grassland / meat 
BG2 VC Organic honey  Semi natural habitat / honey 
BG3 VC “The Wild Farm"  Grassland / meat 
DE5 VC Water protection bread Arable farming / grain 
ES1 VC Cooperative rice production  Rice 
ES2 VC Organic wine in Rueda Permanent / wine 
ES4 VC Olive integrated production Permanent / olive 
FI3 VC – CO - 
RO 
Carbon Market  Forestry / peatland 
FR3 VC Esprit Parc National  Semi natural habitat 
IT4 VC “Carta del Mulino” – Barilla Arable farming / grain 
NL2 VC - CO Green Deal Dutch Soy  Arable farming / soy 
PL3 VC Program “Flowering meadows” Grassland 
PL4 VC Bio-Babalscy  Arable farming / grain 
DE2 RB - VC 
Organic farming for species 
diversity 
Mixed / organic 
FR2 RB - VC Terres de Sources  Mixed / water catchment areas 
Table 8: Farm/forestry types/systems addressed by the contract solutions 
 
Reasons for initiating value chain contracts:  
A major reason for the introduction of value-chain based contracts is the aim to meet consumers 
demand for more environmentally friendly products (e.g. IT4; PL4; BG2; DE2). Often this 
demand triggers the interest of retailers/companies, to introduce contract solutions themselves 
(IT4; NL2; PL3; PL4). An example is the pasta producer Barilla, which has implemented the IT4 
contract solution to deal with consumers’ reorientation towards more environmentally friendly 
products, higher safety, and traceability. In some cases, value chain based contract solutions are 
also initiated by farmers, to better market their products (AT1; BG2; BG4), such as the example 
of AT1, where 45 oxen farmers joined forces to establish a brand and produce high-quality alpine 
oxen meat with higher animal welfare standards. AT1 is also a good example for cases in which 
value-chain based solutions particularly promote certain products from less favoured regions,, in 
order to better place them on the market (AT1; ES2; FR3).  
In other cases, the pressure on specific AECPGs can be in the foreground, as AECPG provision 
is a prerequisite for the product. In the CONSOLE example (PL3), the company Żywiec Zdrój 




of the contract solution by having started the program “Flowering meadows” (PL3) to protect 
biodiversity, but also to guarantee the water resources used by the company.  
Value chain based contract solutions can also be stimulated by players from the public sector or 
the civil society, in order to improve the provision of a specific AECPG (FI3; FR3; DE5). The 
Carbon Market (FI3) for example was initiated by the Finnish Association for Nature 
Conservation and the brand “Esprit Parc National” (FR3) comes from the public organisation 
‘French Biodiversity Agency’. Only one case study was initiated directly by the local government, 
namely the “water protection bread” case (DE5). Here, the government of Lower Franconia has 
started the initiative to respond to groundwater quality problems.  
Last but not least, value chain solutions can be implemented in a bottom-up, solid, quick and 
robust way (NL2).  
Controls/monitoring:  
The sample of CONSOLE value chain contracts reveals a wide range of different systems to 
control and monitor compliance with the contracts requirements: There are control systems in 
which a third party is commissioned to undertake the control and carries it out on an annual basis 
(AT1; IT4). In such system, normally a certain percentage of farms are inspected (e.g. 30% of 
total farmers tested in IT4). In PL3 the program controls are carried out by the National 
Foundation of Environmental Protection Centrum UNEP/GRID-Warsaw. UNEP/GRID is the 
foundation that manages the program on behalf of the company and its control covers the 
implementation of the required activities, as well as the environmental monitoring of mowed 
plots. In some examples, controls are carried out by the processors/retailers themselves, with 
emphasis on quality control of the final product rather than environmental requirements (NL2; 
PL4). In PL4 for example, the control covers parameters such as variety, taste, smell, presence of 
diseases, moisture of grains, and grain contamination.  
In cases, where value-chain contracts mainly foster the marketing of organic products, monitoring 
is conducted in line with AES monitoring. In the cases of BG2 and BG3 for example, this 
monitoring is conducted by an independent certification organization for organic farming. 
In the case of DE5, monitoring is carried out by the local water supplier, and/or by the involved 
research institute. Here, the annual controls do not only involve the participating farmers, but also 
all other actors in the value chain such as the participating mills and bakeries.  
Finally, in the case of FI3, experts of the initiative “carbon market” conduct monitoring 
themselves. Here monitoring is rather irregular and depends on resources available, monitoring 
objective is mainly of the success of the restoration measures for example by checking the 
condition of the dams.  
 
The CONSOLE value chain case studies have shown that the rules can be set by different actors. 
In the Austrian example (AT1) the primary rules were set by the farmers themselves. In the 
flowering meadows program (PL3), they were defined by a nature conservation organization and 
in the Barilla case study (IT4) the company (Barilla) determined the requirements.  
 
Communication strategy – Marketing - online shops and brands: The motivation for 
companies (retailers, distributors, processors) to enter into contractual solutions linked to the 
provision of public goods often has the objective to improve the companies’ image. For this 
reason, value chain based contract solutions are often accompanied by marketing measures and 
strategies (IT4, DE5, AT1). Furthermore, by communicating the environmental advantages of the 
products and the – potentially – higher quality, it is sought to achieve a higher price with the 




communication strategy, for example through the slogan ‘Drinking water protection through 
reduced fertilizer use’. Selling products online is also of increasing interest. In the case studies 
AT1, ES1, and ES2 an online shop is set up.  
Examples of the marketing strategy and internet pages of the involved brands in the value chain 
contract solutions:   
• IT4: https://youtu.be/njH-FdkmwwQ 
• PL3 http://www.kwietnelaki.karpatylacza.pl/o-projekcie/o-zywiec-zdroj-s-a 
• PL4: https://biobabalscy.pl 
• FR3: https://www.espritparcnational.com 
• ES1 https://arrozua.com/ 
• AT1: https://www.almowelt.at/ 
 





   
In value chain contract solutions, products are often marketed under a specific brand, intended to 
highlight the higher environmental standards, origin, and quality. In the CONSOLE sample of 
value chain based contract solutions, most cases already have a special brand, while some are still 
in the process of brand development. In BG2 for example it was stated “In the long run they 
foresee to invest in their collective processing plant and to distribute the honey products with their 
own environmental brand – organic honey from natural reserves”. The name of the brand can 
directly refer to the environmental aspect (DE5 ‘Water protection bread’ and AT1 ‘ALMO - 
Alpine oxen meat’). In DE2 it is stated as a reason for success, that the project logo on the products 
enables consumers to recognize the products with nature protection benefits. Also, to promote the 
products of a specific region (ES1; AT1) or national park, the creation of a brand can be a valid 
strategy (FR3).  
➢ FR3: “Esprit Parc National” is a collective brand registered by National Parks of France 
and it is implemented in each of the 10 French National Parks. The brand is exclusively 
granted to products or services from economic activities that preserve the biodiversity 
and the heritages. Through this brand, the National parks contribute to the preservation 
of the cultural heritage and the valorization of activities compatible with nature 
protection. The brand is promoted nationally, but still not well known because there are 
few participants and low volumes of branded products (may not attract as many 
consumers as expected). This brand also concerns agroforestry productions in the French 
outermost region Guadeloupe, in particular undergrowth crops such as vanilla, coffee, or 
cocoa. 
➢ ES1: The Arrozua program covers almost the entire value chain, from the rice farmers to 




under the Arrozua brands (i.e., the Doña Ana and El Ruedo labels) and the white labels 
that are commercialized by Spain high-value retailers (e.g., El Corte Inglés). 
➢ AT1: The brand continues to develop and responds to the animal welfare requirements of 
the population and to the desire for online trading. 
 
 Reasons for success and failure  
Through the joint analysis of the value chain contracts, 10 reasons for success, and 1 reason for 
failure were identified.11  
Reason for success #1: Market-driven approaches  
Most value based chain contract solutions represent market-driven approaches (FI3, BG3, BG2, 
PL3, AT1, ES1, ES2, ES4, IT4, FR3, and PL4), for which no public funding is needed. The 
independence from public funding can be seen as a strength of value chain based contract 
solutions. The payment mechanism often consists in a higher product price achieved on the 
market. Consumers are willing to pay this price premium because of e.g. the higher quality, the 
environmental standards, the regionality. In DE2 “Efforts rewarded by the market” have been 
identified as a strength of the solution. In FR3 it is explained: “Payments are coming from the 
consumers. The Payment for Environmental Services (PES) corresponds to the monopolistic 
competition mark-up (positive price difference due to the discrimination of the product), if any, 
associated with the branded product compared with a standard product. A strictly positive mark 
means that some consumers voluntary contribute to the environmental objectives of the brand 
while buying the branded product”. Only in the DE5 case study there is a dependency on funding 
which is mentioned as a threat: ”project funds (are) essential for project success at the current 
stage”.  
Reason for success #2: Trust and good communication within the value chain: Trust between 
the different actors along the value chain is an important factor for success and acceptance (IT4, 
DE5, PL4, PL3). For example, DE5 and PL4 report a particularly high acceptance among the 
participating farmers, while highlighting the high level of trust and good communication as the 
basis for success. In DE5, trust is created by meetings and the mutual visiting of all actors of the 
value chain. “The visits of a water utility, a farm, a bakery, and a mill were important for the team 
spirit and contributed to strengthen the sense of community”. In PL4 it is said, that the cooperation 
within the chain is largely based on mutual trust and friendly relations between farmers (grains 
suppliers) and the processor. The farmers and the processor meet twice a year and agree on 
deliveries. If there is a lack of trust, good cooperation between the actors along the value chain is 
unlikely. PL3 mentioned as a weakness in the contract solution: “Some plots are small and 
unreachable by the program due to distrust, reluctance or passive attitude of landowners to 
cooperation”.  
Reason for success #3: Profitability and price premium: Profitability and price premium for 
the farmers are important success factors in value chain contracts. In the majority of the value 
chain contract solutions, a higher price or higher profitability for farmers was specifically 
mentioned. In PL4, where the acceptance among farmers is particularly high it is said that 
“Farmers get a good price for the cereals. The indicators of the economic performance show that 
price premium for organic pasta/wheat production is high at both, farm and processing levels. 
”Also in the cases ES2, ES4, DE2 and AT1 the farmers receive a higher price for their products. 
In IT4 the connection between the provision of AECPGs and the higher price is mentioned: “the 
contract that is linked to the provision of AECPGs also stabilises the income of farmers and gives 
them a premium on the product price”. In FR3 it was stated as a risk for the contract solution if 
                                                     
11 Something is considered a reason for success if there is an indication of a benefitting influence in the contract 




the price, even if higher than usual, was not sufficient to cover the cost of environmental efforts, 
the fee, and other transaction costs.  
Reason for success #4: Focus on regional and short value chains    
Strong regional focus of the value chain, with a special involvement of local partners, is 
supportive (DE5, AT1; ES1; FR3). On the one hand, the direct benefit for the region is visible, 
and on the other hand, the relationship between the partners can be built up more easily due to 
personal contacts. This connection to the region is particularly visible in AT1 and DE5. A specific 
brand can also become an economic factor for the whole region. This is notably illustrated in AT1 
“ALMO-brand” and ES1 “Arrozua-brand”: “The Arrozua brand is an economic factor for the 
whole region. It also influences the tourism sector, because rice is very important in the local 
gastronomy”. In FR3 the short value chains are named: “Short value chains are promoted to create 
more local value and social links with the National Parks and to make National Parks an asset and 
an opportunity for neighbours rather than a source of environmental constraints hampering the 
economic development”. Furthermore, in DE2 the regional value chain with focus on organic 
management and species diversity is seen as a strength.  
Reason for success #5: Communication strategy – Marketing - online shops and brands:  
A sound marketing, clever branding and a thought through communication strategy are important 
success factors of value-chain based contract solutions.  Multiple CONSOLE case studies reveal, 
that by communicating the environmental advantages and the potentially higher quality of the 
products, higher consumer prices can be charged to compensate for the additional expenditure.  
Reason for success #6: Use of existing long-term relationships as a basis for a value chain 
approach: In some cases, the value chain based contract solutions, especially if they implement 
a regional approach, can be based on, existing relationships. For example, this is the case in PL4 
and DE5 both building upon longstanding contractual relationships. In PL4 it is reported that “The 
cooperation lasts for many years already (with some farmers even since 1993)”, while 
simultaneously the high level of long standing mutual trust is highlighted. 
Reason for success #7: Perceived fairness along the whole value chain: To ensure fairness, it 
is particularly important to create transparency along the value chain, especially concerning 
pricing. In DE5 it is expressed that: “There is no pronounced competitive situation as all 
participating mills offer comparable pricing conditions to the participating farmers, the quantities 
are negotiated individually in contracts. Between the bakeries and the mills, the pricing is fully 
left to the market”. Also in PL3, a fair financial remuneration for the farmers for maintenance and 
mowing the meadows increases the perceived fairness. Perceived fairness can also be fostered by 
equal bargaining power. This is specifically described in PL4: “That is why the relationship 
between farmers […] and the processor […] may be described as a close partnership rather than 
a typical buyer-seller connection. One may say, thus, that both parties have almost an equal 
bargaining power due to the fact that all partners in the chain are aware of their mutual interests. 
Farmers appreciate assured payments and good prices offered by the processor, but also the 
possibilities of sales of large quantities of produce. Farmers declare that they "simply" like to sell 
their grains to Mr. Babalski”.  
Reason for success#8: Product purchase guarantees: There is less risk and a higher acceptance 
on the farmers’ side, if the contracting party guarantees to purchase the products from the farmers 
when the farmers meet the requirements (DE5, AT1; DE2; IT4). In IT4 it is said: “For the farmers, 
the risks are the usual ones of agricultural productions. If the quality of the product is not high 
enough for the Barilla processing, the price premium is granted in any case to cover the higher 




Reason for success#9: Collective characteristics: Farmers in a value chain contract solution can 
act as a collective and join together. In many of the contract solutions, farmers join together, 
particularly to bundle their bargaining weight in the value chain. This merging can take place in 
the form of an association, organization of producers, or cooperation. Following are some 
examples from the CONSOLE case study sample on how the collective characteristics can be 
implemented. 
➢ BG3: A collective initiative of four farmers applies animal welfare standards, organic 
standards, agri-environmental measures for the production of beef.   
➢ BG2: Farmers organize themselves in the organization of producers for organic honey. 
Each farmer sells his production to the organization of producers of the farmer, that 
represents the first collective effort among organic beekeepers in Bulgaria. 
➢ PL4: Over 90 farmers delivering to Bio-Babalscy, most of them being members of the 
EKOLAN association - Association of Organic Producers in Cuiavia and Pomerania.  
➢ ES1: An association of 1100 farmers created in 2005 (Arrozua) provides a foundation for 
the producers to produce and market rice with higher quality. The farmers collectively 
fund the cooperative. Cooperatives are organizations managed under the principle of 
collective ownership and the democratic control of members, as well as the tracking of 
adherence to common values and cooperative principles.  
➢ ES4: Sometimes, cooperatives are involved in the contracting parties and they provide to 
the farmers a better price for their product.  
➢ AT1: The farmers are organized in an association (ALMO-Verein) founded in 1988. The 
association consists of 500 members (mostly farmers). The farmers deliver their oxen to 
the Schirnhofer company. Schirnhofer is a meat-producing plant. They organize the 
slaughtering, processing, and selling of the oxen.  
 
Reason for success#10: Quality and originality play an important role: Quality and originality 
are often regarded as important sales arguments (AT1; BG2; ES1; PL4). In BG2 for example it is 
stated: “A Bulgarian product with high quality from the natural reserve can reach the Bulgarian 
market and consumers, whose demand for Bulgarian eco-friendly foods is rising in recent years. 
The quality of the honey is very high due to the characteristics of the region”. Often, product 
requirements for farmers shall ensure a higher quality: “In terms of products quality, the farmers 
are required to be part of a process to enhance their production: enrolment in a process to identify 
the quality and origin of their production or be labelled in organic agriculture or proposing direct 
sale, short circuit or be registered in a collective approach product valuation (territorial brand...) 
or value their production through a transformation activity (FR3).” 
Reason for success and failure#1: Production rules and requirements for farmers: The right 
scale for setting requirements for farmers in value-chain based solutions is a balancing act. On 
the one hand, production rules and requirements must be transparent, strict and controlled enough 
to maintain consumers’ trust. On the other hand, the implementation of rules and requirements 
need to be feasible for the producers. In FR3 it was mentioned that: “Stringent requirements […] 
restrict the number of potential participants”.   
Reason for failure#1: Dependence on distributor/contractor: The dependence on a single 
distributor or processor is stated as a weakness in several case studies. BG3 named as the main 
weakness, that at the moment the contract for distribution is only with one contractor. The 
dependence on one contractor is also confirmed in AT1, where all meat is delivered to only one 
buyer. The dependence on retailer for the premium price was reported in the DE2 case study.  
 Conclusions 
• Most of the value chain contracts are market-driven approaches, no public funding is 
needed. The independence from public funding can be seen as a strength of value chain 




the market. Consumers are willing to pay this price premium because of e.g. the higher 
quality, the environmental standards, or the regionality.  
• Successful implementation of a value chain contract requires a price that covers the cost 
for the provision of the AECPGs (e.g. opportunity costs, management costs, costs for 
fees, transaction costs). The higher quality and the environmental benefits of the products 
in the value chain needs be financially compensated. 
• The motivation for companies (retailers, distributors, processors) to enter into contractual 
solutions linked to the provision of public goods is often also to improve their image. For 
this reason, value chain contract solutions are often accompanied by marketing measures 
and strategies. 
• Farmers should not become too dependent on a single contractual party (processor, 
distributor, retailer). 
• Guaranteeing good levels of equity and fairness, as well as high level of trust and good 
communication enhances acceptance particularly in value-chain based solutions.  
 
3.2.4 Land tenure-based contract solutions 
 Contract description and specifications 
10 of the 60 CONSOLE EU case studies represent contract solutions characterized by land-tenure 
(LT) arrangements with environmental clauses. The functioning of these contract solutions is 
mainly that landowners (private or public) lease their land to farmers, foresters under certain 
conditions to achieve some form of ecological improvement.  
Ctry  ID Contract  Title In-
depth 
BG BG4 LT Conservation and restoration of grasslands in Strandzha and 
Sakar mountains for restoring local biodiversity and 
endangered bird species 
yes 
DE DE3 LT Collaboration for sustainability between institutional land 
owners and tenant farmers 
 
FI FI1 LT Forest Bank - a forest conservation program in Indiana and 
Virginia, US 
 
FI FI4 LT Pasture bank – a platform for pasture leasing  
FI FI5 LT-VC-
CO 
Green jointly owned forest - TUOHI yes 
FR FR1 LT Eco-grazing - Grazing for ecological grasslands 
maintenance in the green areas of Brest Metropole  
yes 
LV LV2 LT DVIETE LIFE  yes 
PL PL1 LT – CO Natural Grazing in Podkarpackie Region yes 
PL PL2 LT - CO Program “Sheep Plus” - Provincial Program of Economic 
Activation and Preservation of the Cultural Heritage of the 
Beskids and Kraków-Częstochowa Upland 
 
IT IT3 LT Rewilding of detention basin in Massa Lombarda  
Table 9: Overview table about case studies assigned to the contract type land tenure, information about 
country, ID, contract, title and whether the case study was additionally analysed as an in-depth study.   
In the following, the case studies representing land tenure contract solutions are shortly described: 
➢ BG4: Under a project financed in parts by the LIFE + program, the Bulgarian Society for 
Protection of Birds purchased and leased out over 600 ha land to farmers with 
requirements to restore and maintain the pastures in an environmentally friendly way. 
➢ DE3: Institutional landowners lease their land to tenant farmers requiring a sustainable 




➢ FI1: Private forest owners convey both land development and timber rights to a quasi-
financial institution, the Forest Bank, in exchange for guaranteed annual payments, the 
value of which is based on the landowner’s standing timber.  
➢ FI4: Pasture bank is a platform through which landowners and domestic animal herders 
can connect with each other and agree on a land-tenure contract for leasing pastures or 
grazing animals. Either the animal herder pays for wild pastures, or the landowner who 
leases grazing animals pays for the herder.  
➢ FI5: In TUOHI, the contract solution includes private investments in the jointly owned 
forest in form of invested money or forest property. Monetary investments are spent for 
acquisition of forest land. All shareholders of TUOHI have agreed on the management 
regime based on continuous cover (uneven-aged) forestry. 
➢ FR1: The Head of Green Spaces of Brest Metropole has chosen to entrust the 
management of the mowing of some of their green spaces to an eco-grazing service 
proposed by a breeder with a part of his flock of Scottish Black Face-bred sheep. 
➢ LV2: In the LIFE+ project DVIETE, grassland restoration contracts have been concluded 
between the Latvian Fund for Nature (LFN) and the landowners who carried out and got 
reimbursed for grassland restoration. The contracts included the requirement to maintain 
the restored areas. In the after LIFE program, land lease agreements or agreements on 
“grazing of biologically valuable grasslands” have been concluded between the Dviete 
Valley Parish Association and the landowners for grazing management. 
➢ PL1: The Natural Grazing in Podkarpackie program was introduced to preserve, protect, 
and restore the biodiversity of invaluable natural areas. Therefore, an open call is 
organized each year in which non-profit organizations (e.g. foundations, associations, 
NGO cooperatives) and other eligible parties present their offer to arrange grazing on 
specific areas of land by subcontracted farmers, who provide animals (cattle, horses, 
sheep, goats, and deer) and plots of land for grazing. 
➢ PL2: Each year an open call is organized in which non-profit organizations (e.g. 
foundations, associations, NGO cooperatives) and other eligible parties present offers to 
arrange grazing on specific areas of land by subcontracted farmers, who provide animals 
(sheep and goats) and plots of land for grazing. 
➢ IT3: Purchase of private land by a public association for environmental and natural hazard 
management. 
 
The land-tenure cases PL1, FR1, BG4, FI4, and PL2 are all devoted to grassland systems and 
grazing management, often targeting grazing of sheep. FI4, PL1, and PL2 are thereby quite 
similar, with contracts concluded on a yearly basis. FR1 and BG4 represent longer contracts (6 
and 7 years). In IT3 and BG4, land is first purchased by public authorities or associations and is 
then leased back to farmers with environmental clauses. In the cases of the Forest Bank (FI1) and 
TUOHI (FI5), the mechanism works the other way round: Here, forest owners provide their land 
to an organisation for cultivation. LV2, where land tenure agreements are introduced in the 
aftermath of a LIFE+ project, demonstrates that land tenure contracts are also suitable to maintain 
previously implemented measures in the long term; the protection of public goods is thus 
guaranteed even after the end of a restauration measure. In DE3, land tenure contracts with 
sustainability clauses are replacing classic tenure contracts with the rental price as key decision 
criterion.  
From the EU case study sample of land-tenure contract solutions it becomes obvious that often 
they represent “follow-ups” to different programs and projects, and are often introduced by public 
or civil society organizations. The program “Podkarpacki Naturalny Wypas” (PL1) as well as 
“Owca Plus” (PL2) were established as a public initiative. In FR1 the Brest Metropole issued a 
call for tender. In the cases of LV2 and BG4 LIFE+ projects have been the basis. FI4, pasture 
bank, is a platform initiated by Rural Women’s Advisory Organisation together with ProAgria. 




DE3 was first a private initiative, while after the ending of the project tenants and land owners 
founded an association. Finally, the forest bank (FI1) is a private scheme set up by the nature 
conservancy.  
 
Farm/forestry types/systems:  
Table 11 gives an overview of the farm/forestry types/systems addressed by land tenure based 
contract solutions. 50% of the land tenure contract solutions are devoted to ‘grassland systems. 
Two cases address forestry, additional two are designed for farms that are located within water 
basins or flood plains and one is mainly focussing on arable farming.  
ID Contract  Title Farm types addressed 
BG4 LT Conservation and restoration of 
grasslands in Strandzha and Sakar 
mountains  
Grassland 
DE3 LT Collaboration for sustainability 
between institutional land owners 
and tenant farmers 
Arable farming (grassland) 
FI1 LT Forest Bank  Forestry 
FI4 LT Pasture bank  Grassland 
FI5 LT Green jointly owned forest  Forestry 
FR1 LT Eco-grazing  Grassland  
LV2 LT DVIETE LIFE  Flood plain 
PL1 LT – CO Natural Grazing in Podkarpackie 
Region 
Grassland  
PL2 LT - CO Program “Sheep Plus”  Grassland  
IT3 LT Rewilding of detention basin in 
Massa Lombarda 
Water basin 
Table 10: farm/forestry types/systems addressed by the land tenure contract solutions 
 
Reasons for land tenure contracts: Land tenure based contract solutions often target 
extensification of area, with a strong focus on maintenance. As already described, such 
agreements are particularly often used in order to maintain and restore high-value 
pastures/grassland (PL1; FR1; BG4; FI4; PL2). The land tenure contract solution in LV2 was 
created to maintain the environmental improvements from a LIFE+ project and the FI1 - Forest 
Bank attempts to blend economic and ecological objectives by protecting valuable habitats and 
watersheds and executing ecologically sound forest management that yields reasonable financial 
return to landowners. In DE3 in contrast, an agricultural system dominated by large-scale fields 
and an intensive agricultural production with a high share of rented land is targeted. Here, under 
the contract solution, land can be only leased if farm individual lending criteria, connected to 
ecological (and social) aspects are planned and carried out. 
The initiator of the contract solution: 
The CONSOLE sample of land tenure contract solutions reveals two main initiating 
groups/actors. The first group are private and civil society organisations, such as NGOs, various 
organizations or associations. The pasture bank platform (FI4), for example, was initiated by 
Rural Women’s Advisory Organisation together with ProAgria which is a Finnish expert 
organization. The second initiating actor is the local government, such as in the cases of PL1, 
PL2, and FR1.  
Controls/monitoring:  
In contrast to the other three types of contract solutions, at least in the EU sample of land-tenure 
based case studies controls seem to play a subordinate role. Five of the ten land tenure cases report 
no or no systematic control system (DE3; FI4; FI5; FR1 and IT3). In the cases of LV2 and BG4 




monitoring are performed and in BG4 monitoring of the conservational management on the 
pastures is executed by the Bulgarian Society for Protection of Birds. In PL1 and PL2, more 
comprehensive controls are conducted. These controls assess the status of task implementation, 
effectiveness, reliability, and quality of implementation, the correctness of spending public funds, 
and properness of record keeping. In PL1, at least 10% of beneficiaries are controlled. 
 
 Reasons for success and failure  
Through the joint analysis of the land tenure contracts, 6 reasons for success were identified.12  
Reason for success #1: Focus on a specific area: Land tenure contracts are usually related to a 
specific, well-defined area. Examples from the case studies are valuable grasslands to be protected 
(PL1, PL2, LV2, FI4), specific habitats, e.g. bird breeding areas (BG4), specific forest areas (FI1, 
FI5), a district (DE3), or a water basin (IT3). The areas are often priority ecological and 
environmental areas, which are adjacent to or directly in national, state forests or parks, or other 
existing conservation and recreational areas (FI1, BG4, PL1, PL2, LV2).  
It is clear that land tenure contracts strongly relate to ownership. Beside private landowners land 
can be owned and leased by one organisation/public authority (e.g. FR1 – Brest Metropole), or 
by several institutional land owners including the church and municipalities (DE3). For a 
successful implementation of land tenure contracts, it is essential that the location of area for 
AECPG provision is paired with a suited ownership structure, and that finally the agricultural 
system in the region, or at least the farming system of some farms is suited to integrate the land 
tenure system into the farming concept (PL1, BG4, and FR1). If implementation is possible, land-
tenure based solutions can provide a territorial or landscape approach, which offers advantages in 
terms of AECPG provision. In the case of DE3 for example, it was mentioned that “The 
landscape-oriented approach puts the land ownership and the land management into a spatial 
context going beyond the borders of the agricultural holding and the property, enabling more 
demanding measures” and in FI1: “The collection of land is managed by one entity, the Forest 
Bank, which operates at the scale of landscapes and watersheds and thus can greatly expand 
biodiversity and other conservation effectiveness”.  
Reason for success (and failure) #2: Contract design. The case studies showed that land-tenure 
based agreements can offer long term solutions, giving the parties planning security and 
confidence (FR1, BG4). For example, the grazing contract in FR1 has a duration of 6-years, in 
order to guarantee a long-term vision for the tenant. In the Finnish example FI5, the contracts are 
even permanent and in FI1 the length of participation can be fixed-term (30 years) or permanent 
(99 years). Nevertheless, this permanent or long-term aspect of the contracts can also be a reason 
for failure as in the FI1 case study it was stated: “Many forest owners are not willing to give up 
timber and land development rights for 30 years or permanently”. In IT3 the duration of the 
commitment is 20 years. In the case of grazing contracts, the contract periods are shorter and also 
one-year contracts exist (PL1, PL2, and FI4). If also funding is provided on an annual basis, the 
risk for the tenant gets higher, particularly if adaptations in the farm management are necessary 
to join into the contract.  
Besides aspects of contract duration, it also became obvious that land-tenure based contracts 
should be addressed directly to the land managers, while subcontracting should be avoided (see 
PL1).  
Last but not least, it became clear that the lower profitability and the increased management 
efforts needs to be reflected in the lease price. In BG4 for example, farmers can rent the land 
                                                     
12 Something is considered a reason for success if there is an indication of a benefitting influence in the contract 




under protection for free, while being in parallel eligible for governmental support for maintaining 
the pastures in conservational manner (practice-based subsidy). 
Reason for success #3: Compatibility with land managers’ objectives and regional specifics. 
As already indicated above, land tenure based contract solutions need to fit to the participating 
farms and regions. FI1, for example, incorporates private landowner preferences related to the 
environment, income, and risk in the contract solution, in order to reach a higher acceptance. PL1 
and PL2 emphasised the importance of compatibility with the region: Programs which fit well to 
the needs, traditions and culture of the region are better evaluated by the beneficiaries and 
involved parties and in the end, more successful (PL1, PL2).  
Reason for success #4: A shared vision of environment and high trust between the 
contracting parties. A common understanding between the contracting parties about where they 
want to go (in terms of environment, land management and economic aspects) and a basis of trust, 
are aspects often raised in the context of successful land tenure contract solutions. A shared vision 
is especially emphasized in the BG4 case study: “All the partners in the contract share a common 
vision that agriculture must go hand in hand with nature conservation and biodiversity protection” 
and confirmed by the FR1 case study naming as a major strength of the solution “Goodwill and 
shared trust/vision between contractors”. In FI5 it is said that “They [the participants] also share 
a vision that uneven-aged forest management results in bigger overall benefits than traditional 
even-aged forest management.” FR1 reports high trust between the partners, also compromises 
are made by both parties. DE3 named as a threat, the unequal power relation (landlords, tenants).  
Reason for success #5: The contract solution provides multiple benefits. The EU case studies 
revealed that it contributes to the success of the contract solution if multiple benefits can be 
derived from it. In addition to the benefit for the environment, there can also be economic, social, 
and cultural benefits. In FR1 social co-benefits (social link, urban agriculture) are reported: “Eco-
grazing has been successful with the population, (…) more animal-friendly”. In PL2 it is said: 
“The program brings measurable environmental, cultural and economic benefits. The outcomes 
of the environmental monitoring showed significant improvement of biodiversity in natural 
habitats. In the economic aspect, the tourist infrastructure was modernized and expanded to 
improve the accessibility and attractiveness of the areas included in the program”. PL1 stated: 
“Farmers and contracted organizations can obtain some economic benefits while preserving, 
protecting and restoring the biodiversity on valuable natural areas”.  
Reason for success #6: Advantages for tourism (especially eco-tourism).  BG4, PL1, PL2, 
IT3, and LV2 mentioned the benefits from tourism and for tourism in relation to the land tenure 
contracts. Tourism can have a twofold influence on the contractual solution, on the one hand it 
can be a strength of the contractual solution if it increases the attractiveness of the landscape, 
which in turn is beneficial to tourism. Also, it can be advantageous for the success of the 
contractual solution if nature conservation is given a higher priority through the additional income 
generated by ecotourism. For example, the rewilding of the detention basin in Massa Lombarda 
opened the doors for tourism (IT3). In the PL1 case study it was stated: “The presence of animals 
on pastures increases the aesthetic value of the landscape, which contributes to increasing the 
tourist attractiveness of the region”.  Also PL2 reported that, touristic attractiveness of the region 
favoured the implementation of the program. In BG4 it is considered a weakness that there is no 
possibility to include ecotourism in the region. 
 
 Conclusions 
• For a successful implementation of land tenure contracts, it is essential that the location 




the agricultural system in the region, or at least the farming system of some farms is suited 
to integrate the land tenure system into the farming concept (PL1, BG4, and FR1).  
• Direct and longer-term contracts, which offer the farmer planning security, are an 
advantage. However, it is most important that the length of the contract matches the 
subject matter of the contract. In the case of grazing contracts, for example, the contract 
periods are shorter and there are also one-year contracts. For contracts that address forest, 
the contract periods are rather long. 
• Land tenure contracts often report mutual benefits. In addition to the benefit of the 
environment, there can also be economic, social, and cultural benefits. Often the contracts 
can also make a positive contribution to ecotourism in the region. 
 
4 Lessons learned from contract solutions from outside the 
EU/cases beyond the CONSOLE EU case studies 
 
This section distils the lessons learned from cases and solutions developed beyond the CONSOLE 
EU case study sample, aiming at an improved delivery of AECPGs. The range of different agri-
environmental contracts reported in this section have been reviewed in the task 2.3 “Analysis of 
successful experiences outside Europe”: the objective of that task is the building of a catalogue 
of experiences from different contexts that could add new and interesting perspectives for 
application in the EU and to feed into WP2 and the CONSOLE project a wider range of 
opportunities for contract design. 
To optimise the relevance for the CONSOLE project, the task 2.3 will build a living document to 
support the activities of the project with a particular attention on grey literature to scan potential 
solutions able to overcome the hurdles for the implementation of new contract solutions. 
In table 11, the current review of cases is outlined. 113 documents have been collected and 
screened. Among these, 65 cases have been reviewed. In addition, the data base includes 8 reviews 
of cases aimed at finding limitations and/or reasons for success of several cases worldwide, and 
2 documents focusing on potential solutions that are proposed but not applied in the real world. 
As described in section 3 for the EU cases, many cases belong to more than one contract type as 
shown in the following table. 
  Secondary approach type 













Result based 30 6   
Collective  3 8   
Value chain  1 1  
Land tenure 3 5 1 5 
Table 11: Number of cases per contract type reviewed from outside the EU. The table outlines the number 
of cases where a mixed approach involving more than one solution type was proposed. 
In the review of cases beyond the CONSOLE EU case studies, result-based contracts are the most 
commonly found. Moreover, collective agreements are the contract type more commonly mixed 
with other forms of contract solutions. Currently, value chain contracts are the least represented 
solution. The search of that kind of contracts will be more specifically focused in the future efforts 
regarding the task 2.3. 
It should be noticed that the reviewed cases are developed in socioeconomic and environmental 
contexts that are different from the EU. In addition, the policy context is usually not embedded in 




to the EU. On the other hand, in many cases the tradition of e.g. result-based solutions is longer 
than in the EU and that will give interesting real-word examples to develop this kind of solutions 
in the EU. 
The improved solutions that have been reviewed are developed to improve the delivery of 
AECPGs and tackle a range of limitations of more traditional contracts. A range of limitations of 
traditional forms of contracts can be summarized in: general difficulties in building of collectives, 
technical/economic complexity of monitoring results, reduced uptake due to high risks, 
administrative burden, spatial mismatch between provision of services and benefits in case of 
“global” AECPGs (e.g. carbon stock).  
In the review cases, the contract arrangements outlining interesting solutions for CONSOLE are 
organized in three main streams as follows: 
- New arrangements of the actors involved in the contract. A widespread problem of agri-
environmental schemes is to strike a balance between measures that are easy to uptake for the 
farmers and at the same time sufficiently fine-tuned to improve the environment. Thus, the 
intermediary is in practice a catalyst for the success of more environmental-effective types of 
contracts. A range of solutions proposes the implementation of more articulated schemes 
facilitated by the introduction of intermediaries. The objective of the intermediary is the reduction 
of transaction costs (e.g. administration and organisation costs reduced by means of a third party) 
or to shift the risks from land managers to private or public investors (e.g. the risk of not achieving 
results in result-based solutions). Examples of these solutions are e.g. the Environmental Impact 
Bond (EIB), the Forest Bank Program in USA (also included in the EU cases as FI1), or a range 
of local watershed trusts developed in Latin America. In the EIB, the intermediary is a hub 
between land mangers (up-taking the measure), investors (buying green bonds) and public payer 
(granting interests to the investor if the result is achieved).  
- Improved solutions for direct/indirect monitoring of the results. Various approaches try to 
“circumvent” one of the most important hurdles in result-based schemes: monitoring of results. 
Several examples and studies propose to collect a mix of direct and indirect information through 
different tools (e.g. auctions mixed with modelled results13), remote sensing combined with 
models, self-monitoring solutions, new “futuristic” options like the DNA barcoding. In this 
category, we also include the “joint liability” contract which combines collective and result-based 
solutions. The joint liability features a collective agreement where the payment is gauged on 
AECPGs results. The monitoring of results is however not based on a statistical sampling 
procedure that would not be feasible in terms of costs and efforts. Indeed, peculiar aspect of the 
collective agreement is to consider the result measured in one (or few) of the members of the 
collective as a direct proxy for the result of the whole collective.  
- Payment setting. E.g. conditional credits. In this category, we include solutions that leverage on 
more attractive payment types that in some cases can achieve higher acceptability among farmers. 
These examples are more common in developing countries or, more in general, in areas featuring 
high environmental stakes (e.g. Amazonia) under threats of agricultural expansion. In general, the 
incentive regards loans or better credit conditions linked to environmental commitments or result 
achievement. These approaches leverage on reducing the credit costs for land managers that in 
some cases could be more attractive than incentives and facilitate the uptake of the environmental 
                                                     
13 Auctions are coupled with result-based approaches so to prioritise the areas that are less expensive (better auctions 
from farmers) but also more effective in potential result (assessed by an ecological model). This solution is in theory 
very effective (best match between costs and effectiveness) but not based on direct monitoring of results. As the 




measure. In some cases, it could be considered an anticipated payment as the credit is granted 
based on the commitment, whereas the result achievement is verified afterwards. 
This typology of contract improvement could help the categorization of new solutions. Indeed, 
the three streams could target different socio-economic contexts or even “farmers types”. For 
instance, the first solution type could be effective in cases of weak governance settings or when 
it is difficult to build-up a collective. The second group is useful when result-based solutions are 
considered acceptable by the farmers but the operational application of payments by result is 
complicate. Finally, the third solution type could stimulate the uptake of environmental schemes 
in specific contexts.  
4.1 Reasons for success 
On the base of the analysis, here following are listed the main reasons for success or failure of the 
cases beyond the CONSOLE EU case studies that are considered most interesting for the 
improvement of EU contract solutions. The reasons for success are based on a qualitative analysis 
of the case descriptions and are not presented in order of importance14.  
Reason for success 1: reducing risks linked to results. Focusing on variables that farmers 
perceive not under their control led to higher risk, pressure and “disutility” for farmers. For 
instance, the complexity to control and monitor results drove to a shift from result- to action-
based schemes in the Florida Everglades Water scheme. On the contrary, focusing on long-term 
range of measurements (e.g. in a slot of several years in the Swiss pastures) ensured to limit the 
effect of adverse events on results. In the Environmental Impact Bond, the risk for farmers is 
shifted on private investors following a green bond scheme. That solution could be useful when 
farmers’ interest for result-based payments is low and privates’ interest for environmental results 
is high. However, in the Environmental Impact Bond the land manager essentially agrees to 
uptake an action-based scheme and all the awareness/education added values acknowledged to 
result-based solutions are no more relevant15. 
Reason for success 2: reduced costs for monitoring results. In two cases, a high cost of 
monitoring was the reason that limited the scheme survival. On the contrary, in other cases relying 
on lower level information provided by farmers or volunteers resulted in higher efficacy. In a 
further example (joint liability), the cost of the information is reduced by reducing the sampling 
intensity. That could be particularly useful for “landscape level” species such as birds for instance 
that depend on landscape level practices and less on local on-farm practices. 
Reason for success 3: farmers’ interest and social revenue. In a pilot scheme in UK the high 
interest of farmers in the target variable (earthworms) helped to involve and engage them in the 
measurement and payment by result schemes. In the Prairies Fleuries in France, the possibility 
for farmers to show their capacity to their peers was considered a reason for success (including 
the prize ceremony at the national agriculture show). 
Reason for success 4: resources. Obviously, sufficient availability of funding is necessary. 
Successful examples include cases where available funds were present. For instance the Vittel 
Water scheme in France where the private water investor was able to offer high payments and 
even the purchase of land in the watershed. However, it is relevant to notice that the availability 
                                                     
14 NB it is relevant to define the assessment of “reason for success”. In many cases, a solution was considered 
successful because the uptake by landholders was good or simply because the contract survived the setting up phase 
and was active after several years. In some cases, the implementation of the scheme was only in a pilot phase and 
the success is therefore potential. Success in terms of measured environmental result are very scarce also in the case 
of result-based solutions. 
15 The intermediary in the EIB is nonetheless appointed to manage and adapt the scheme to improve the effectiveness 




of resources alone is not sufficient. Resources are effective when employed to facilitate a shift 
towards more environment-friendly practices.  
Reason for success 5: additionality. In some land tenure cases, the additionality was not a 
necessary condition. For instance, the biodiversity easements or the land fire abatement were 
granted for areas even though these were not probably objective of developments or agricultural 
expansion. These schemes are more similar to protection/preservation schemes. 
Reason for success 6: relying on existing collectives. The possibility to rely on a well-
established collective ensures better results. On the other hand, the building ex-novo of a 
collective is usually complicate. It is the case of the carnivore payment scheme for predators’ cubs 
in Sweden. The payment was calculated on the expected disservice for the local Sami populations 
derived from the reindeer attacks of lynxes and wolverines. The Sami are traditionally organized 
in collectives (villages) and that eased the implementation of the scheme, monitoring of results 
and in general lower transaction costs. 
 
Reason for success 7: communication. In the Florida Everglades, the scheme started as result 
based, but payer and farmers agreed to shift to action based solutions after the first years. The 
monitoring was considered too complicate and stochastic both by the farmers involved and the 
public agency. Even though shifting from result-based to action-based schemes can be considered 
a failure, without mutual communication and willingness from both parties the scheme would 
have been stopped. In this example, we stress how communication and ability to adapt to 
constraints is relevant for the implementation of successful schemes. 
Reason for success 8: payment setting. In some cases, cost reduction is more attractive than 
higher revenues. That is the case of reducing interest rates or tax reductions conditional to some 
agreed environmental result. The cases following that approach are common in Latin America 
where credit access is sometimes a limitation. Therefore, the potential of this approach in EU 
needs to be considered carefully.  
Reason for success 9: the intermediary. In many cases, the existence or ad-hoc creation of an 
intermediary was a necessary condition for ensuring the implementation of more articulated and 
effective contracts. That is the case of many watershed trusts charged for organizing and 
distributing the payments for improving water quality. That is also the case for the Environment 
Impact Bond where the intermediary is the pivot of the whole scheme. 
5 Inspirations/Recommendations for improved contract 
solutions 
CONSOLE analysed 58 contract solution case studies from within the EU. Of these 58 EU case 
studies, 26 were analysed in-depth. Moreover, 2 case studies came from outside the EU. A further 
65 contract solutions beyond the set of CONSOLE EU case studies have been analysed via 
literature review. This chapter combines findings of the analysis of the EU case studies including 
the findings of the in-depth analysis and the review of contract solutions beyond case studies. 
General recommendations are provided, as well as recommendations concerning the specific 
types of contracts considered in CONSOLE.   
The EU CONSOLE case study sample consist of 22 cases with collective implementation, 21 
result-based, 15 value-chain and 10 land tenure contract solutions. The CONSOLE case studies 
revealed that these 4 contract types often occur in combinations: 1/3rd of the case studies combine 
elements of different contract types. Hereby, the combination of collective implementation with 




confirmed in the literature review of cases beyond the case study sample. Collective agreements 
in particular were the most common found in combination with other scheme types. 
CONSOLE considers 14 different AECPGs. All 14 AECPGs were directly addressed in at least 
one EU case study. The public good “(Farmland) biodiversity/habitats” is most frequently 
addressed (46 times). Following, though with a considerable gap, is “Landscape and scenery” and 
“Water quality”.  
Noteworthy is the fact that almost ¾ of the CONSOLE case studies are directed to a specific area.  
Regarding the contract relationships in the EU case studies, 5 relationships can be distinguished: 
Nearly half of the case study contracts analysed (46%) are public-private partnerships, more than 
1/3rd of the contracts are private-private partnerships (36%). 12% of the contract solutions 
represent three-way relationships between public-private-civil society, 4% represent relationships 
between civil society (NGO) and private sector and 2% (one case study) is established between 
two public parties. In 41% of the EU case studies, the financing party is the government with EU-
funding (whereby two-thirds are part of the EU countries’ rural development programmes 
(RDPs)). Public money without EU funds is the source of funding in 19% of the contract 
solutions. Private funds account for 40% of the contract solutions, with market sector-oriented 
schemes contributing 37% and consumer-oriented schemes 3%. The incentive payments are the 
most commonly used payment mechanism (28) in the EU-case studies, followed by product price 
(19). 
The review of cases beyond the EU case studies aimed at finding cases and solutions proposing 
alternative solutions and ideas for the Project. As noted above, the socioeconomic context is 
however different for the EU cases. In many cases, the government is not the financing party. 
International bodies like the World Bank are however commonly reported especially in payments 
for ecosystem services schemes in developing countries. Government-based schemes are typical 
in the cases from USA, Australia and China. Finally, a well-represented share of cases is 
implemented by NGOs including a range of examples where institutions financed by private 
citizens are developed (e.g. water trusts). 
Targeting the contract solution to a specific region  
The EU case studies indicate that regional targeting can benefit the success of the contract 
solutions: in regional solutions the land managers/owners are aware of the region-specific 
environmental criticalities and problems. These environmental problems can be reflected either 
in economic losses or in perceivable changes to the landscape and can result in the land 
managers’/owners’ will to become active. The specific regional problem awareness might initiate 
processes where land managers/owners become active themselves (bottom-up approach) or where 
some regional actors initiate new solutions. Regional problem awareness can also lead to higher 
acceptance of contract solution already offered by the local or national government, as 
farmers/foresters/land managers/land owners understand their meaningfulness. Lesson learned: 
Targeting the contracts to specific regions addresses regional criticalities and enhances the 
farmers’ and foresters’ interest and understanding of measures. 
Targeting the contracts to specific AECPGs 
Particularly the results of the in-depth studies showed that targeting measures to specific AECPGs 
improves the success of the contract solutions. AECPG targeting is particularly important in 
result-based approaches. In RB/RP solutions, excellent targeting can be reached, when 
conservation objectives are farm- and plot-individually elaborated. Additionality can be achieved 
by integrating tiered payment levels, providing financial incentives to the farmers to deliver the 
highest quality environmental product in their particular farm setting. In other contract types, 
excellent targeting is achieved by setting clear sets of objectives and measures, guaranteeing a 




learned: Defining and setting clear AECPG targets, and designing management measures with 
high relation to AECPG improvement, enhances effectiveness. 
Integrating farmers’ interests and knowledge 
It is beneficial to consider farmers’ and foresters’ knowledge, interests and priorities from the 
outset. The involvement of farmers/foresters can lead to a higher compatibility of the contractual 
measure with the business design of the land manager/landowner. Furthermore, early integration 
of the land managers/landowners can result in a higher acceptance of the contract solution and 
the management measures, as it enhances the feeling of equity and fairness (right to a say, co-
construction, perceived fairness). In cases where joint elaboration of the contractual measures is 
not possible, it is important to ensure that the measures are targeted to the specificities of the 
prevalent agricultural/forestry system. Lesson learned: Involving land-managers in target-setting 
and measure development leads to higher equity, compatibility with their businesses and can 
create win-win situations. 
Keeping it simple 
On the one hand, complex and cumbersome contract solutions are a barrier to farmers’ 
participation. On the other hand, solutions which are easy to uptake for the farmers might at the 
same time not be sufficiently fine-tuned to improve the environment. Therefore, measures and 
results of the contract solutions should be clearly communicated. The link between the measures 
and their impact on the AECPG should be obvious and understandable. Farmers/foresters should 
feel able and skilled to implement the contractual requirements and measures, where suitable 
receiving specific advice or integrating intermediaries. A limited administrative burden for land 
managers/landowners is also mentioned as an advantage. Lesson learned: A simple and clear 
design of the contract solution and a good comprehensibility can enhance participation. 
Striving for economic feasibility and attractiveness   
Successful contract solutions should be economically attractive for the land managers/-owners 
(win-win-situations). The payments should cover the costs for the provision of the AECPGs (e.g. 
opportunity costs, management costs, costs for fees, transaction costs). Most important, however, 
is that farmers perceive the payment to be fair. The literature review of extra-EU contract 
solutions revealed that more attractive payment settings and payment types can be are a reason 
for success. For example, cost reduction or investment support might be more attractive than 
higher revenue. That is the case of reducing interest rates conditional to some agreed 
environmental result or tax reductions.  Lesson learned: Fair payment levels, win-win-situations 
and payment settings beyond subsidies are leverages for increased acceptance and demand of 
contracts. 
 
Enhancing social and cultural capital.  
In successful contract solutions the building of social and cultural capital is mentioned as a success 
factor in supplement to the economic aspect (especially in RB/RO and CO/COOP contracts). 
From the in-depth studies it became obvious, that enhancing social and cultural capital positively 
contributes particularly to the longevity of contract solutions and AECPG provision. A variety of 
measures and influences can have a positive effect in this respect, e.g. by creating a group identity 
through regular meetings, by education and training measures aimed at building up knowledge 
and awareness, as well as by supporting the self-perception of acting AECPG. Lesson learned: 
Setting measures suited to enhance social and cultural capital can support the longevity of 





Fostering a shared vision, knowledge exchange and communication 
The EU case studies showed that a shared vision, targeted communication, meetings and 
cooperation between the contract parties and within the groups of involved actors/land managers, 
resulting in increased social interaction and a “feeling of belonging”, can lead to the development 
of social capital and trust. A case study from outside the EU showed that communication in 
contract solutions is also of particular relevance when a measure does not work as intended; in 
this case mutual communication and the will to adapt the contract solution helped to find a good 
way to continue the contract. Lesson learned: Fostering communication and creating a common 
understanding and vision between the contracting parties about where they want to go (in terms 
of the environment, management and economic aspects) enhanced engagement and motivation. 
 
Ensuring equity and fairness 
High levels of equity and fairness are first and foremost achieved, if producers are involved in the 
discussion of contract arrangements, or if close and long-standing relationships exist between the 
contracting partners, e.g. between producers and retailers. Beneficial for perceived equity and 
fairness are reasonable, clear and acceptable contract conditions, and the same rules and basic 
prices for all partaking producers. In contractual solutions based on collective implementation or 
cooperation, a key aspect for equity and fairness is contribution to and equity of decision making, 
which can be implemented via steering groups or other institutional arrangements. Lesson 
learned: Guaranteeing good levels of equity and fairness enhances acceptance, particularly in 
value-chain based solutions  
Using of familiar structures and existing relationships 
The possibility to rely on a well-established structures and relationships ensures better results, 
since it can ease the implementation of a contract solution, the monitoring of results and in general 
lower transaction costs. Lesson learned: Building on already existing structures and relationships 
when designing contract solutions leads to easier implementation and cost reduction. 
Collective components positively impact on effectiveness of in the contract solutions.  
The integration of components of collaboration/collective implementation, or the full 
combination with collective agreements can be a condition for the success of other contract 
solution types.  In some contract solutions it has been reported that they have been designed 
collectively after either the preliminary contract has failed or the desired environmental success 
has not been achieved. Collective elements can e.g. be supportive, if environmental objectives are 
addressed by result-based solutions, but can only be achieved on landscape level, so good results 
can only be reached if land managers cooperate.  Also, in the case of monitoring of results, 
collective approaches such as a “joint liability”, can be interesting. The joint liability features a 
collective agreement where the payment is gauged on AECPGs results. The monitoring of results 
is however not based on a statistical sampling procedure which would not be feasible in terms of 
costs and efforts. Indeed, peculiar aspect of the collective agreement is to consider the result 
measured in one (or few) of the members of the collective as a direct proxy for the result of the 
whole collective. In value chain contracts, a collective component often takes the form of an 
association of farmers; this association increases the farmers’ negotiating power and can improve 
their position in the contract. Lesson learned: Including components of collective agreements into 
contract solutions can enhance the success in terms of reaching AECPG objectives on level 
beyond farm/field/plot scale and in terms of generating social control and mutual motivation e.g. 
through joint liability. 
Ensuring financial resources to maintain the long-term success of the contract solutions  
In several case studies, the lack of future funding was mentioned as a threat for the contractual 




funding. One option for ensuring longer-term funding and obtaining planning security is to 
consider a future incorporation of pilot contract solutions into e.g. the national agri-environment 
program. That means the integrability is already taken account of in the design process.  In other 
case studies, the possibilities of generating private funds are examined. The involvement of 
private investors/companies is particularly an option if they are interested in the protection of a 
specific AECPG (water bottle manufacturers want to achieve high water quality in a certain area) 
or want to improve their image. It is also a good option if the contractual measure enables products 
to be sold with an environmental added value, thus enabling additional private funds to be 
attracted via the value chain. Lesson learned: To activate market mechanisms (e.g. carbon market, 
value chain) can avoid the risk of expiring public funding. 
Adapting the complexity of contract solutions to the national/regional context and 
experience 
The review of extra EU and the analysis of the EU cases, revealed that different regions have 
different settings, levels of knowledge and experiences. Also it becomes obvious, that the 
different contract solutions types as well as their combination represent different levels of 
complexity. Enforcing highly complex contract solutions in areas where preconditions are not 
suited as regards e.g. knowledge, awareness, education, networks, etc, might not be effective. It 
seems that particularly collectives and result-based only work in “special” socioeconomic 
contexts where the conditions for these contracts to succeed exist: result-based solutions are in 
parts very sophisticated and complex, also in the development of the right indicators and in their 
measurement while collectives are hard to build where people are not used to work in collectives. 
Value chain contract solutions in contrast are effective mainly if consumers’ awareness is high, 
etc. As soon as the regional setting is not suited for the introduction of complex contract solutions, 
“easy” action driven solutions might be more effective. In these cases, a possible solution to 
implement more articulated and “complex” initiatives to improve the scheme environmental 
effectiveness is the development of intermediaries as described in the section 4. Lesson learned: 
It becomes clear that result-based and collective solutions don’t fit in all socioeconomic and 
cultural contexts, as they often demand high levels of knowledge and collaborative skills. Value 
chain approaches are often only suited if consumers’ awareness is high. 
6 Outlook on further use of Deliverable 2.4 for scientific 
analyses and for practice  
Further scientific exploitation 
Operationally, Deliverable D2.4 will support task 1.2 and 1.3 towards the development of the 
operational framework to be developed in the CONSOLE project and tested with practitioners. 
Furthermore, the results of the scientific analyses from deliverable D2.4 inform particularly WP3 
in the development of farmers and stakeholder survey on the feasibility of new contract solutions 
in tasks T3.2 and T3.3.  
Use of the in-depth diagnosis for practitioners 
Agricultural and forest management has a strong influence on the provision of agri-
environmental-climate public goods (AECPGs). Support provided under Europe’s Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) for more environment-friendly approaches in agriculture (but also for 
forestry) is increasingly discussed, as current agri-environmental measures are often 




ecosystem services and public good provision in Europe is ongoing (Pe'er  et al., 201916). Reacting 
on strong societal pressures, under the premise of the legislative proposal for the next CAP 
programming period and the recently published European Green Deal, it is therefore foreseen to 
pursue the path towards the provision of public goods in rural areas far stronger. Improvements 
may come from a flexible mix of promising new contract types, such as result-based payments or 
collective approaches, as well as by novel value chain strategies and land tenure contracts with 
environmental clauses.  
 
The presented contract specifications and reasons for success and failure of ca. 120 case studies 
in and outside the EU details the knowledge of successful contract solutions. The diagnosis 
provides practitioners and programmers with information about the contract design and 
specifications in which promising and innovative contract solutions for the effective and lasting 
delivery of AECPG by agriculture and forestry can be set. The diagnosis serves as a knowledge 
basis for the development and design of future contract solutions to foster the provision of 
AECPGs by agriculture and forestry in the European Union and beyond. 
Dissemination 
Deliverable D2.4 will be published on the webpage of the CONSOLE project (www.console-
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AT3 X                    
AT2  X                   
IT5  X                   
IRL2 X                    
DE1  X  X                 
DE2 X    X                
DE4  X  X                 
FI6  X                   
FI2  X X   X               
FR2 X    X                
AT4 X                    
NL3 X    X X               
NL4 X    X X               
FR4 X    X                
IRL3 X  X                  
IRL1 X  X                  
BE3 X  X                  
BE4  X X                  
LV3  X                   
FI3  X X  X                
IT1   X                  
IT2   X                  
IT6   X                  
UK1   X                  
UK2   X                  
UK3   X                  
UK4   X                  
UK5   X                  
NL1   X                  
FR5 X  X                  
LV1   X                  
BE1  X X                  
BE2    X                 


















































































































































































































LV4    X                 
PL1   X   X               
PL2   X   X               
NL2   X  X                
BG2     X                
BG3     X                
FR3     X                
AT1     X                




 X                
DE5     X                
IT4     X                
ES1     X                




 X                
BG4      X               
FI1   X  X X               
FI4      X               
FI5   X  X X               
FR1      X               
DE3      X               
IT3      X               
LV2      X               
BG1 OTHERS               
IRL4 OTHERS               
ES3 OTHERS               
*Contract types: RB: Result-based; RO: result-oriented contracts; CO: Collective implementation; COOP: 
cooperation; VC: Value chain-based contracts; LT: Land tenure-based contracts; Colour indicates that the 
contract type is involved as the main type and grey indicates that only one component is involved. 
**AECPGs: green box: Main AECPG objectives addressed by contract solution; yellow box: Additional AECPGs 
considered by the contract solution 
Table 12: Case studies allocated to the contract types, and AECPGs 
